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PREFACE
Norman L. Greene
The role of the moderator is to be an advocate for the lis-
tener, ensuring that the presentations are proceeding as
planned, that the speakers are clear and have a full opportunity
to express their points of views, and that the key issues are ad-
dressed. In an evening paneled by brilliant thinkers, there was
little for me to do as moderator except not get in the way and
enjoy the symposium, and that is what I tried to do. The results
were extraordinary. However, in order to ease the reader into
the symposium, I wish to highlight-although not entirely sum-
marize-the presentations and add some thoughts of my own on
capital punishment.
Can we define who deserves to die? How will we know
them, and what should we do with them after we identify them?
Professor Robert Blecker argues that there are some offenders
so much worse than others that not only do they deserve death
but also we are obligated to kill them. "[Tihe 'worst of the
worst' are real and can be known and . . . we can, and must,
identify and execute them as soon as possible."' He stresses the
importance of our own feelings in determining who should die:
Ultimately, the question of the death penalty is a moral question,
and every moral question is at its base an emotional question. So,
the 'worst of the worst' are real; we can know them; we can be
certain that they deserve to die. But we can only be certain be-
cause we feel certain. We can know those who deserve to die only
by using a richer language of informed emotion. 2
Some are "objectively the worst of the worst. We say he's worse
because he is worse. Really, objectively."3 Professor Blecker
finds some common ground with the other speakers, explaining
why death row is over-inclusive since it contains many people
who should not be death-eligible. 4 "They are murderers, they
ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES FROM 1973 THROUGH 1995 (2000), and A BROKEN
SYSTEM PART II: WHY THERE Is So MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES AND WHAT CAN
BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002).
1. Infra p. 182.
2. Infra p. 131.
3. Infra p. 127.
4. Professor Blecker would also expand the death penalty, including as fol-
lows: "[clorporate executives who knowingly maintain deadly work places, and
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are guilty, they are bad, they have done terrible things, but they
are not 'the worst of the worst.' "5 "We search for bad character,
for evil, for the 'worst of the worst' criminal and not merely the'worst of the worst' crime."6
Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier, deftly playing on superla-
tives, concludes that the system is set up to seek the "worst of
the worst," but it instead gets the "unluckiest of the worst," or
maybe the "unluckiest of the unlucky" in the cases where the
defendants are innocent, or the "sickest of the sick," since many
capital defendants are "brain damaged, victims of childhood
sexual and violent abuse... ."7 Rather than exclusively execut-
ing the "worst of the worst" (assuming arguendo that could be
determined), society also seems to execute, among others, the
poor, the condemned who lost by narrow votes of clemency
boards, defendants whose attorneys file late appeals, or defend-
ants whose mitigating evidence surfaces too late. Executions
are also based on incomplete information and vague and compli-
cated aggravating factors, and selecting only the "worst of the
worst" is not possible. "And that's the moral question: What
does the death penalty say about us when we make decisions to
kill a human being based on incomplete information? We know
our initial reactions and feelings, but we do not really know the
individual."8 Furthermore, regardless of his culpability at the
time of the crime, the condemned may be a very different person
and have even turned his life around by the time of his execu-
tion, as in the case of Karla Faye Tucker or Wilbert Evans.9 He
will then no long qualify as the "worst of the worst." The execu-
tion likewise devastates the "innocent relatives of the con-
demned . . .-.
Professor Kirchmeier rejects Professor Blecker's test:
The problem when we talk about moral outrage as being the ba-
rometer in deciding who is executed is that it ends up looking a lot
thereby callously kill their own poor employees, or knowingly pollute streams giv-
ing people cancer, deserve in my view to die for it because they are acting with
heinous, atrocious and depraved indifference to human life." Infra p. 177.
5. Infra p. 130.
6. Infra p. 124.
7. Infra p. 139.
8. Infra p. 141.
9. See infra notes 120-22.
10. Infra p. 138.
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like the obscenity test: "I know it when I see it.". . . [T]he Consti-
tution will not tolerate arbitrariness in decisions of who lives and
who dies where we can just say "well, yeah, that's one that I
would kill.""
To the same effect, David Von Drehle points out that "[olne
judge can think the worst possible case is X and the next judge
will say, 'no, that's not the worst, the worst is something else'"
and adds "that the long running, now thirty year, attempt to
identify and separate" out the worst "has not brought us any
closer to the solution."12 Capital punishment "has proven over
many, many years and in every jurisdiction to leave the justice
system tied up in knots, contradicting itself and ultimately fail-
ing to deliver the punishments it claims to be meting out[.]"13
Although not part of the program, philosopher Stephen Na-
thanson has written that determining who deserves to die is
complex if not impossible because "we cannot count on our legal
institutions to make judgments of moral desert in a fair, in-
formed, and rational way... [and] even if knowledge about what
people morally deserve is theoretically possible, we ought not to
expect it to be obtained in the legal context."1 4 "Under the guise
of an attempt to determine the precise degree of a defendant's
moral culpability, they will simply be measuring their own de-
gree of distaste for him and his actions."' 5 "Judges, prosecutors,
jurors, and other officials who act within the legal system are
under many practical constraints and are influenced by many
factors that have nothing to do with the moral desert of an ac-
cused person." 16 Furthermore, Professor Nathanson argues
that "even if we can appraise people's level of moral desert,
there is no specific punishment or treatment which goes with
any level of desert" and "[tihere is no such thing as a uniquely
appropriate punishment for any particular crime."' 7
11. See infra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
12. Infra p. 167.
13. Infra p. 170.
14. STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE: THE IMMORALITY OF PUNISHING
BY DEATH 91 (2d ed. 2001). Judge Erlbaum credits, in his annotations to his re-
marks, Professor Nathanson, a professor of philosophy, for influencing him in di-
verse ways throughout this project. Infra note 177.
15. NATHANSON, supra note 14, at 92.
16. Id. at 91.
17. Id. at 95.
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In a presentation described by David Von Drehle as "the
classic, old-fashioned tub-tiumping moral case,"'8 Judge Wil-
liam Erlbaum contends that there is no self-defense justifica-
tion for executions, since the condemned does not pose an
imminent threat to the life or safety of the executioner, and an
execution corrodes our tradition of not kicking someone when
he is down. Execution is also a ritual killing 9 which harms
even the executioners 20 and kills the mentally impaired; rests
on vengeance which is inconsistent with our law;21 wastes tax
dollars which might be better used on the neglected murder vic-
tims' families; and diverts trial and appellate courts from im-
portant work.22 Judge Erlbaum counters Professor Blecker's
position (as he summarizes it) to the effect that "They are the'worst of the worst.' They deserve to die. I know that. I feel
certain,"23 by responding with his own statement of feeling
which he claims has equal value to and which therefore negates
18. Infra p. 166.
19. See, e.g., Roberta M. Harding, Capital Punishment As Human Sacrifice: A
Societal Ritual As Depicted In George Eliot's Adam Bede, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 175
(2000).
20. Executioners as a group have long been stigmatized:
The odious name of hangman ... a stigma upon the man who bears it, and
so it will be as long as it denotes one who publicly strangles another man or
breaks him on the wheel. This fact is not now founded on public opinion, but
on the overwhelming force of the instinct that abhors every murderer except
the man who murders in self-defence; which proves incidentally that the
death-penalty is contrary to nature and beyond the jurisdiction of society.
Arthur Isak Applbaum, Professional Detachment: The Executioner of Paris, 109
HARv. L. REV. 458, 479 (1995) (citation omitted). In the article, the executioner
from the French monarchy to the French Revolution's Reign of Terror, Sanson, is
quoted in a fictional dialogue to the effect that the innocence or guilt of his victim
is not his concern. While this must be so, one who kills and chooses to kill under
these circumstances is a troubling if not perverse character. As Sanson states:
In exercising my professional duties I must set aside personal considera-
tions. I naturally have views, held at varying degrees of certainty, about the
guilt or innocence of my victims. I may personally admire or loathe those
who come before me .... These are the views of Charles-Henri, man and
citizen. But the executioner must set aside the reasons of Charles-Henri, for
it is not Charles-Henri acting on the scaffold, but the Executioner of Crimi-
nal Sentences of Paris.
Id. at 483-84.
21. See LEwis E. LAwEs, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING 157 (1928) (Capital
punishment "is a punishment for revenge, for retaliation, not for protection").
22. See infra notes 183-206 and accompanying text.
23. Infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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Professor Blecker's statement: "They don't deserve to die. I
know that. I feel certain."24 He concludes that "[t]he two testi-
monials nullify one another, leaving the retributionist at square
one."25
Professor Jeffrey Fagan describes his renowned Columbia
Law School study of error-prone capital cases, frequently result-
ing from incompetent defense; judicial bias both in instruction,
interpretation and application of the law; and prosecutorial or
police misconduct. He suggests that proof be required "beyond
any doubt that the defendant committed a capital crime"26 and
that the death penalty be barred for "defendants with inher-
ently extenuating conditions-the mentally retarded persons,
juveniles, [and] severely mentally ill defendants,"27 but notes
that whether errors will still haunt the system after these and
other reforms are in place is an "empirical question."28
I will not conclude whether it is possible to determine the"worst of the worst," leaving that analysis to the panelists.
However, I would like to raise a question about the death pen-
alty itself and what it means in a sense not raised by each of the
participants as they wrestled with who, if anyone, should be the
ones selected to die. No death penalty program or preface
would be complete without at least a brief inquiry into what we
mean when we talk about the death penalty itself. Specifically,
my question is whether the death penalty-total corporal pun-
ishment-is merely a euphemism masking numerous conse-
quences which are inconsistent with modern moral notions. Is
our use of language masking a series of unacceptable tortures
with the name of the death penalty?29 Is there anyone who
would doubt that any one of the following would be inconsistent
with our society's values-blinding someone, depriving him of
speech or hearing, rendering him paralyzed, destroying his
24. Infra p. 153.
25. Id.
26. Infra note 162 and accompanying text.
27. Infra p. 149 (citation omitted).
28. Infra p. 150.
29. For the horrifying consequences of executions themselves, see Deborah W.
Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 412
(1997) (describing "botched executions" by electrocution, lethal injection, and le-
thal gas since the United States Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)); id. at 419-20 (the botched electrocution of Wilbert Evans
who was mentioned in Professor Kirchmeier's presentation).
2003] 113
PACE LAW REVIEW
memory, and leaving him without feeling? Yet if we take all of
these tortures and call them death-for surely death has all the
effects of these actions and more, the individual consequences
seemingly can be ignored. 30
Furthermore, should we allow a condemned person to sub-
stitute a severe corporal punishment, but one less than death,
and if not, why not? Through a few sentences in The Gulag Ar-
chipelago, author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn implicitly makes the
same inquiry, describing Russian Empress Elizabeth's replace-
ment of execution "with flogging with the knout; tearing out
nostrils; branding with the word 'thief;' and eternal exile in Si-
beria" and wonders whether the prisoner condemned to death
today would voluntarily consent to such punishments so long as
he could live, but "we, in our humanitarianism, don't offer him
that chance."31
Finally, Professor Blecker comments that some may accept
that there are evil people deserving of death "without embrac-
ing a correlative obligation of society to kill them." He notes one
rationale for this position-not trusting the State "to do it
right"-is a "cynical rejection of government."32 But in re-
sponse, one might ask who is administering the judicial system;
why they might not be trusted; and whether there is good rea-
son for it. This leads, among other things, to an examination of
judicial selection reform, and in particular, the dubious effect of
judicial elections on our criminal justice system in capital as
well as non-capital cases and even civil cases. Commentators
have noted that incumbent judges have been attacked and de-
feated in judicial elections for their decisions in capital cases,
and the death penalty overall has played a prominent role in
the election, retention and promotion of judges, as well as
30. See Norman L. Greene, The Context of Executive Clemency: Reflections on
the Literature of Capital Punishment, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 513, 531, 547-49 (2000)
(citing, among other things, Victor Hugo, to the effect that prosecutors use euphe-
mism to describe the "bloody [guillotine] basket" to make it appear "rose-tinted and
respectable"). Executions also present particular problems in a secular age such as
ours where there is no consensus that an afterlife follows execution and therefore
on where, if anywhere, the condemned goes after death. Modern executions have
been viewed as the assertion of the right to send the souls of the condemned to
places unknown. Id. at 549 (citing Victor Hugo).
31. ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956: AN Ex-
PERIMENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION 432 (Thomas P. Whitney trans., 1973).
32. Infra p. 129.
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shaped the campaign debate.33 As the American Bar Associa-
tion has found, incumbents risk "losing their tenure when they
uphold unpopular laws, invalidate popular laws, or protect the
rights of unpopular litigants," including capital defendants. 34
This has led to calls among writers in capital punishment liter-
ature for replacement of the elective system with an appoint-
ment system for judges with terms of substantial length.35
These calls have been echoed by others focusing on the perni-
33. A.B.A., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, 20 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY]. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases,
75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995); see Ronald J. Tabak et al., Capital Punishment: Is
There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 423, 529-32, 569-80
(1996); see Richard R. W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death
Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Pun-
ishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 610, 638 (2002) (authors "observe a
strong relationship between election years for judges and the likelihood that a de-
fendant will receive a death sentence," and "even in a jury trial, judges were still
able to influence the juries' decisions in various ways, particularly through jury
instructions"); Bright & Keenan, supra, at 812 n.280 ("judge can influence the
course of a case by his tone, body language, relations with counsel, and rulings on
evidentiary points," referring to an account of the "Scottsboro Boys" case). An at-
tempt has been made by North Carolina attorney Bruce Cunningham to seek a
moratorium on the death penalty pending the establishment of an appointive judi-
cial selection system which has obtained editorial support. See Editorial, Impose
Death Sentence on Judicial Elections, PILOT, N.C., Oct. 7, 2002, at Cl ("North Car-
olina can have an independent, impartial judiciary, or it can have an elected judici-
ary. It can't have both. That's especially true with respect to cases involving the
death penalty."). Former North Carolina Chief Justice James Exum described how
his election opponents raised the issue of the number of his dissents in death pen-
alty cases, requiring him to demonstrate the amount of times he concurred in cases
sustaining the death penalty. Ronald J. Tabak et al., supra, at 530.
34. Id. at 19; see also Brooks & Raphael, supra note 33, at 611 n.8 ("The term'political suicide' is often used to describe the likely consequences when elected
officials appear unsupportive of capital punishment."). See also Harris v. Ala-
bama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'[Hligher authority' to
whom present-day capital judges may be 'too responsive' is a political climate in
which judges who covet higher office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must
constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty.").
35. Bright & Keenan, supra note 33, at 818. Such a system for election of
judges should be replaced by an appointive selection system in which a "bipartisan
judicial qualifications commission" with both lawyers and non-lawyers "nominates
a slate of qualified candidates to the executive, who then nominates a judge subject
to confirmation by at least one branch of the legislature." Id. Evaluation of the
judge would not be by retention election but rather by evaluation by a commission.
Id.
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cious effects of judicial elections on civil justice as well.36 Pro-
fessor Fagan also confirmed a correlation between a state's rate
of serious error in capital cases and its elected judiciary.37
I hope that our readers will study these wonderful
presentations, which our speakers have expanded with schol-
arly footnotes since the night of the symposium, as they refine
their positions on capital punishment and participate in the
ongoing debate.
Martin J. Leahy
My name is Martin J. Leahy; I am a solo practitioner here
in New York and a member of the Committee on Capital Pun-
ishment. I would like to thank all those people who are respon-
sible for putting this program together; Norman Greene, who is
the Chair of the Capital Punishment Committee, Jeffrey
Kirchmeier, and the Honorable William M. Erlbaum. I would
also like to thank Kevin Doyle, the Honorable Barbara Jaffe,
Russell Neufeld, Carlos Diaz-Cobo, and Maria Pedraza-Perez,
who are also members of the Committee.
I was very fortunate when I was in law school to have Rob-
ert Blecker as my Criminal Law professor; in fact, I made it a
point to take every course I possibly could with him while I was
there. While I do not agree with his views on capital punish-
ment, I believe that he has a very important message to pre-
sent. While Robert Blecker supports the death penalty, he
believes that the current statutes are too broad, and that funda-
mental changes need to be made in the capital punishment sys-
tem, restricting the death penalty to only those of the most
heinous murderers, those he calls the "worst of the worst."
While this program was being formulated a number of im-
portant events occurred which makes tonight's program even
more relevant. The Illinois Commission set up by Governor
George Ryan to study the Illinois capital punishment system
came back with a very lengthy list of fundamental changes that
had to be made in their state's capital punishment system;38 the
36. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 33.
37. Infra pp. 143.
38. See COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMIS-
SION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/
ccp/reports/commission-reportcompletereport.pdf [hereinafter Illinois Report].
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Constitution Project also released a report entitled Mandatory
Justice: Eighteen Reforms to the Death Penalty in which it too
proposed fundamental changes be made.39 Columbia Univer-
sity released Broken System Part II: Why Is There So Much Er-
ror in Capital Punishment, and What Can Be Done About It. 40
The report was co-authored by Professor James Liebman and
Jeffrey Fagan who we are very happy to have on our panel to-
night. Most recently, within the last couple of days a new Gal-
lup poll was released showing increased support in the last year
for the death penalty. The recent Gallup poll shows that 72% of
those that were questioned support the death penalty for mur-
der, up from 68% last year. The poll also shows that two-thirds
of those questioned believe that the death penalty is morally
acceptable. When given a choice between life imprisonment
and death, 52% chose death. Most disturbing, however, is a sta-
tistic that nearly half of those responding said that the death
penalty is not imposed often enough, while only 22% responded
that it was imposed too often and 24% responded that it is im-
posed just the right amount of times. 41 That brings us to to-
night's program; our distinguished panel will address the issue
of who deserves to die. Robert Blecker suggests that there is a
category of killers who are the "worst of the worst" and that
they deserve to die, but who are they and how do we define who
they are?
I will introduce tonight's panel now so that we don't have to
interrupt the flow of the presentation. Professor Robert Blecker
from New York Law School got his B.A. in 1969 from Tufts Uni-
versity, got his J.D. from Harvard in 1974, and he was a Balch
Traveling and Playwright Fellow in 1969 and 1970. He re-
ceived Harvard Law School's Oberman award for best graduat-
ing thesis in 1974, entitled Root in a Flowing Stream Game and
39. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: EIGHTEEN REFORMS TO
THE DEATH PENALTY (2001), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/dpi/
MandatoryJustice.pdf [hereinafter The Constitution Project].
40. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS So
MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002), availa-
ble at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf [hereinafter Co-
lumbia Study III.
41. Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority of Americans Say Death Penalty Applied
Fairly: Support for the Death Penalty Higher Than in Recent Years, available at
http://www.gallup.com/contentlogin.aspx?ci=6031 (last visited May 1, 2004).
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Sport, which was sponsored by Lawrence Tribe. He wrote an
anti-federalist monologue entitled Vote No! which premiered at
the Kennedy Center in Washington, D.C. After witnessing it
every audience but one voted no on ratification of the Constitu-
tion. I trust he will be less successful with tonight's topic. He
was a special assistant Attorney General in the office of special
anti-corruption prosecution in New York State from 1974 to
1975. He was a Harvard Fellow in Law and Humanities in
1976 and 1977. He is currently a professor at New York Law
School where he teaches a variety of courses in criminal law,
including a course on the death penalty, which he co-teaches
with another instructor. Originally he taught the course with
Russell Neufeld, now he teaches it with Martin McClain, both of
whom are very prominent capital defenders. From 1986 to 1999
he spent thirteen years and several thousand hours interview-
ing inmates at Lorton Prison. Among his writings on the death
penalty are Among Killers, Searching for the Worst of the Worst,
which was published in the Washington Post on December 3,
2000; also in that issue was Getting the view from Lorton. He is
also the author of an upcoming book being published by Basic
Books entitled Who Deserves to Die.
Our second panelist is the Honorable William M. Erlbaum,
who received his B.A. in sociology from Brooklyn College, re-
ceived an M.A. in sociology from the University of Connecticut,
and received his J.D. from Brooklyn Law School. He is an Act-
ing Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, Criminal
Branch. This is his twenty-fourth year on the bench. He is an
adjunct professor of law at Brooklyn Law School. He is also an
adjunct professor of political science at York College, which is
part of CUNY, where he teaches a seminar on the death pen-
alty, entitled Capital Punishment: The Politics of Death. He is a
former chair of the International Criminal Law Committee of
the New York State Bar Association. He is also a member of the
International Human Rights Committee of the State Bar. He is
a member of the Project for the Homeless, here at the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, and he is also a member
of the Capital Punishment Committee.
Our third speaker is Professor Jeffrey Fagan. He has a
B.A. from New York University, 1968; Ph.D. from the Univer-
sity of Buffalo in 1975. He taught at the School of Criminal Jus-
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tice at Rutgers University from 1989 to 1995. He was the editor
of the Journal of Research and Crime and Delinquency from
1990 to 1995. He joined the faculty of Columbia School of Pub-
lic Health in 1995 as a Professor and Director of the Center for
Violence, Research and Prevention. He is a professor at the Co-
lumbia Law School. He is a member of the MacArthur Founda-
tion of Research Program on Adolescent Development and
Juvenile Justice. He is a former member of the National Re-
searchers Committee on the Assessment of Family Violence and
Interventions. He serves on the Editorial Boards of Criminol-
ogy, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Crime and Justice
and the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. He has
written quite extensively, and it would be impossible to list all
the published works he has produced. Therefore, I will just
mention that he is the co-author, along with Professor James
Liebman, of A Broken System, Error Rates in Capital Cases
from 1973 through 1995, and A Broken System Part II: Why
There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases and What Can Be
Done About It.
Jeffrey Kirchmeier is a professor at CUNY School of Law.
He received his B.A. and J.D. degrees from Case Western Re-
serve University, which gave him the University's 1998 Young
Alumni Award for achieving distinction in a profession. Prior to
coming to CUNY School of Law, he was a Forrester Teaching
Fellow and Lecturer in Law at Tulane Law School. Before that
he was a staff attorney at the Arizona Capital Representation
Project where he represented indigent capital defendants in
state appeals, state post conviction proceedings, federal habeas
corpus proceedings, and clemency hearings. Additionally, he
was an adjunct professor at Arizona State University Law
School. He was the editor of a quarterly publication on legal
developments in the death penalty area. The author of several
articles about the death penalty, he remains active in this area,
having worked on capital cases in a number of states. His most
recent law review articles are about the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, the United States Supreme Court's death
penalty jurisprudence and sources used by the United States
Supreme Court.
David Von Drehle was twice honored by the American Bar
Association for outstanding coverage of the justice system, in-
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cluding his book Among the Lowest of the Dead: The Culture of
Death Row, an examination of the death penalty as it has been
applied in Florida. He is currently the senior writer on the na-
tional staff of the Washington Post.
Our moderator for tonight's program is Norman L. Greene.
He is the chair of the Committee on Capital Punishment of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and a member of
the New York City law firm Schoeman Updike & Kaufman,
LLP, where he practices civil litigation. He graduated from Co-
lumbia College in 1970 and New York University School of Law
in 1974. He has published a number of book reviews on the
death penalty in the New York Law Journal from 1998 through
2002. He has been interviewed on radio and elsewhere on the
subject of the death penalty. He has made presentations on the
death penalty before religious, professional and student groups
and in 2000 published an extensive study of the death penalty
in the Capital University Law Review in Columbus, Ohio. He
and the Committee on Capital Punishment have also organized
and sponsored a number of Association programs on capital
punishment, including Governor Ryan's Capital Punishment
Moratorium and the Executioner's Confession: Views from the
Governor's Mansion to Death Row; Sparing Cane: Executive
Clemency and Capital Cases (which featured Dr. Pat Robinson);
The Art of Execution; The Condemned, the Tinkerers and the
Machinery of Death: Capital Punishment in New York Before
1965; and The Death Penalty In The Age of Terrorism, which
was just presented last month; and The Ethics of Death, a con-
tinuing legal education course on capital punishment. And now
I would like to turn the podium over to Norman Greene.
Norman L. Greene
I am the moderator tonight, but Martin made my job a lot
easier. These introductions were wonderful, and I have little to
add at this time. I would like to thank Martin, in particular,
who initiated the idea for this program. Martin came up with
the idea, basically because Robert Blecker was his professor at
New York Law School, Martin took five courses with him, and
this is his sixth. I also am glad to be on the same panel as
David Von Drehle. His book on the death penalty called Among
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the Lowest of the Dead: The Culture of Death Row is a classic. 42
That it is apparently not in print anymore is rather shocking,
and I hope that this will be remedied soon. This is one of the
first books that got me started in the capital punishment field,
and I recommend it to all of you.
The program will run as follows. We are going to start with
Robert Blecker. He thinks that his position is different than
everyone else's. He has suggested that we have an abolitionist
cabal here, and he wants to be the first speaker. After that we
are going to hear from Jeffrey Kirchmeier, followed by Jeffrey
Fagan, then Bill Erlbaum, and lastly, David Von Drehle. Then,
keeping with the spirit of the program, there will be a rebuttal
by Robert Blecker, and that will be followed by questions among
the panelists.
In preparation for tonight's program, many if not all of the
panelists have seen the tape of Robert Blecker's speech deliv-
ered in Oregon a few months ago at a death penalty forum. 43 I
have watched it many times. "The past counts," Mr. Blecker, as
you said in Oregon.
I am delighted that we have the Pace Law Review attend-
ing tonight and publishing this program. Having a publication
by a first-class law review like Pace is very important to us, and
I want to recognize Kevin Wilson, who is here with us tonight to
witness the program, who is the incoming Editor-in-Chief of the
Pace Law Review.
Finally, for those of you who are following our committee's
work, we have a program on the death penalty next month,
which is the last of three which we have grouped together this
spring. That program is on death row, and I ask you to come.44
The prior program was on death penalty and terrorism.45 Bill
Buckley, who is our program chair on the death row program, is
here tonight as well.
We will start with Robert Blecker.
42. DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF
DEATH Row (1995).
43. Videotape: Politics, Justice and the Death Penalty (Wayne Morse Center
for Law and Politics, University of Oregon 2002).
44. See Norman L. Greene et al., Dying Twice: Incarceration on Death Row, 31
CAP. U. L. REV. 853 (2003).
45. See Norman L. Greene et al., Capital Punishment in the Age of Terrorism,
41 CATH. LAW. 187 (2001).
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Robert Blecker
At the outset, let me point out what this discussion is not
about: it is not about the sport of capital punishment. As I de-
fine the difference between a game and sport, in a game, the
move chosen is the move made-automatically. The critical mo-
ment is in the choice of the move, not in its execution. The
game of chess, for example, could be played without a board and
without pieces. The greatest chess player might be paralyzed
and unable physically to make any moves, but proof that the
game had been mastered would lie exclusively in selecting the
right move.
A sport is more complex. Success requires not only choos-
ing the right move, but also making it well enough. Thus, a
football coach or baseball manager can call the plays. The
quarterback or the batter has to execute the play called, actu-
ally throw the pass, or lay down the bunt. Executing well can
be more important than choosing right. (Thus, most profes-
sional athletes get paid more than the coaches who call their
plays for them). The law of the death penalty is like that too.
Many conferences on capital punishment these days focus
on the sport-the process. Speakers recount all that can and
does go awry between the choice of move-the legislature's defi-
nitions of capital murder-and the execution chamber. They
emphasize prosecutorial problems in deciding which cases
among the potentially death-eligible to prosecute as capital;
they explore class or race bias, political and media pressures in
the determination of who gets prosecuted capitally. Experts
may dwell upon the quality of the representation or sources of
error in the sentencing phase, stemming from jury prejudice or
misdirection.
Again, even in the apparent "capital sentencing game," the
interval between the choice of move and its execution is critical.
The jury says "you should die;" but do the people actually put to
death a condemned person? Those who would consider the
sport of capital punishment sentencing may focus upon the ap-
pellate process with its necessary and unnecessary delay, or
upon conditions in death row as the condemned awaits a legal
fate, which will be more likely than not, pre-empted by nature.
Here today, I hope we will not focus on the execution, the
performance, the process, the sport. I hope, instead, we can as-
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sume that moves chosen will be made exactly as planned, know-
ing full well they can never and will never be made exactly as
planned. I hope we will consider, instead, the plan itself and
assume it will play out as we designed it. What would be the
structure, the content of that plan? What materials would we
use? How would we shape an ideal death penalty regime? As-
sume the legislature's formal declaration plays out in fact. As-
sume our representatives could and would define the most
heinous crime and attach the appropriate penalty. Assume a
jury could and would translate legislative commands into ac-
tion. Of course, we should always remember that built into the
game there is the jury spin, which determines in the sentencing
phase whether or not this particular individual, a convicted
murderer, already found to have committed a most heinous
crime, although death eligible, deserves to die.
The capital sentencing process-the particular decision to
condemn or not-remains the essential sport, somewhat inde-
terminate in its actual execution. But again, these comments
today are about the "worst of the worst." This is the substance
of the death penalty law.
Consider several questions, all revolving around substance.
Are some homicides objectively worse than others? Can the
truly "worst of the worst" be described in advance? I hope we
will move beyond the murders and address the murderers
themselves as human beings. Are some really so much worse
than others that they deserve society's ultimate punishment?
Eleven-year old Bobbie-Jo Brown went to make a telephone
call at a convenience store near her house. On the way, she was
swept into a truck by two strangers. They took her to a river-
bank; they raped her; they mutilated her. They took pointed
sticks and shoved them up her vagina so deeply inside her that
they pierced her abdomen. When she begged for her life, they
smashed her face with a brick. An hour later the child died.46
They are the "worst of the worst." They deserve to die. I
know that. I feel certain; and those two words are crucial. I feel
certain, therefore, I am certain. Feeling-emotion-informed
emotion-is very much part of a jurisprudence that is necessary
and sufficient for the death penalty. Feelings of moral certainty
46. State v. Brogdon, 426 So. 2d. 158, 163 (La. 1983).
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drive the legislature to define and the jury to decide questions of
life or death.
The United States Supreme Court made a huge mistake in
my view, as did much of the legal profession since Aristotle,
when they attempted to sever emotion from law and instead,
confine themselves exclusively to rational questions in deter-
mining the Constitutional and moral status of the death pen-
alty.4 7 Emotions must and should be fundamentally part of any
death penalty decision. The murderer's attitude counts, as do
our feelings about his feelings at the moment he or she killed.
Some abolitionists and most advocates today believe that
emotion is properly part of the death penalty. But what must
we "feel certain" about? Surely that he did it. That determina-
tion of guilt or innocence is based largely on rational fact-find-
ing. At sentencing, however, we search for more than guilt. We
search for bad character, for evil, for the "worst of the worst"
criminal and not merely the "worst of the worst" crime.
When we search for evil, when we determine who should
die, are we chasing after anything real? This question goes to
the foundation of western culture: "What there is" really? "You
cannot step twice into the same river; for fresh waters are ever
flowing in upon you," Heraclitus famously declared in the sixth
century, B.C.48 But he also insisted, "man's character is his
fate."49 The Sophists followed Heraclitus in denying that there
was any reality. There was no "truth." Good and bad-the"worst of the worst"-was all a matter of how those in power
defined and enforced it, how it could be made to appear at the
assemblies and law courts. Everything was relative, subjective
and arbitrary. Whatever a person could be convinced of,
whatever a culture thought right or wrong became right or
wrong for it, and nothing more could be said. There was no
greater reality to be known and acted upon.50
47. Cf. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
48. BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 45 (1945).
49. CHARLES H. KAHN, THE ART AND THOUGHT OF HERACLITUS: AN EDITION OF
THE FRAGMENTS WITH TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTARY 81 (2d ed. 1981).
50. Paul Woodruff, Rhetoric and Relativism: Protagoras and Gorgias, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY 290-310 (A.A. Long ed.,
1999).
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So from Heraclitus we have a vision of the universe, includ-
ing the moral universe, as perpetually in flux and flow, a contin-
uum with infinite distinctions constantly shifting. Nothing
really repeats itself; truth isn't real. 51 And from the Sophists
we also have relativism. "Man is the measure of all things...
"-the measure and measured.5 2 It's all appearance and spin,
subjective and arbitrary; everything is all and only what it
seems; truth isn't real.
Today, twenty-five hundred years later, contemporary
skeptics insist that the death penalty is not only unworkable in
practice, but also unreal in principle. They insist that this cate-
gory that we seek, the "worst of the worst," simply is not real, or
it is really only whatever we say it is.
Plato and Aristotle directed their main attack against this
point of view. They insisted that essences were real and can be
known. 53
Today's retributive advocate follows that lead. We insist
that evil is real. Some people really deserve to die and not be-
cause we say so. Rather, we say so because they really deserve
to die. Really, objectively, they are the "worst of the worst."
How do we know them? There are several ways. One is by
enumeration. The killers of eleven-year-old Bobbie-Jo Brown
are the "worst of the worst." Dr. Swango, the doctor who killed
perhaps thirty, perhaps sixty, patients who were very sick,
whose misery he was sparing, the young as well as the old, as
he explained in his journal, simply because he enjoyed watching
people die. It made him feel alive.54
We can point to the "worst of the worst" without ever defin-
ing them. Richard Speck raped and killed eight student nurses
in Chicago; it would have been nine, but he lost count and left
alive the last terrified eyewitness as she hid under a bed.55
51. Edward Hussey, Heraclitus, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO EARLY
GREEK PHILOSOPHY, supra note 50, at 93-101.
52. RUSSELL, supra note 48, at 77.
53. See generally 2 WILLIAM KEITH CHAMBERS GUTHRIE, A HISTORY OF GREEK
PHILOSOPHY 4-6 (1962).
54. Associated Press, "Doctor Death" Given Life Term After Admitting to 1984
Killing, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 20, 2000, at A24. See JAMES B. STEWART, BLIND EYE:
HOW THE MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENT LET A DOCTOR GET AWAY WITH MURDER (1999).
55. See Dennis L. Breo, July 14, 1966, CHIC. TRIB., July 6, 1986 (Magazine), at
1; Sarah Helm, Speck Case Stirs Debate about Parole for Violent Offenders, Hous.
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Ted Bundy is profiled in David Von Drehle's beautifully
written book-Among the Lowest of the Dead: The Culture of
Death Row. 56 This powerful account is, however, radically am-
biguous about whether the "worst of the worst" really exist, be-
cause it was written by an author who is radically ambivalent
about this issue. Von Drehle wrote that "[o]ne person would be
executed while the next one, whose crime might seem much
worse would not."57 Why only "seem" worse? Why not flat out
say "the crime was worse?" "[E]specially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel,"58 Von Drehle continues later, "was an attempt to define
the undefinable."59 "The law was spongy at its core .... 60
"[Elach criminal and crime was subtly unique."61 "Somehow,
using the black-and-white of the criminal code, the system must
determine the very nature of evil... [despite] the slippery heart
of the new law[s] ....
Here we profoundly disagree. The core is not slippery or
spongy-it is hard and real obvious.
Even abolitionist studies such as Columbia's, co-authored
by Jeffrey Fagan, 63 not only point out error but urge reform,
principally by eliminating the midrange of seriousness and, in-
stead, confining death eligibility to the "worst of the worst."
Studies like these, widely cited by abolitionists as support for
ending the death penalty, nevertheless presuppose what Von
Drehle seems to deny, that the "worst of the worst" are real and
can be described in advance.
Now, whether this reformers' strategy embodied in the Co-
lumbia Study is merely a stop along the way to abolition, I leave
for future events to reveal. Whether it stems from a post-Sep-
tember 11th realization that 90% of the American people might
support the death penalty in some cases, or from a fear that
some States with the penalty would expand it, while others who
CHRON., Sept. 13, 1987, at 7; Lynda Gorov, Speck-The Man No One Can Forget,
CHIC. SUN TIMES, Aug. 25, 1987, at 7.
56. VON DREHLE, supra note 42.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id. at 156.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 161.
61. VON DREHLE, supra note 42, at 165.
62. Id.
63. Columbia Study II, supra note 40.
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have abolished it might reinstitute it, so that it is better to limit
what we cannot yet eliminate, or from a genuine goal to attempt
a morally refined death penalty, it suggests a convergence-a
common search for the "worst of the worst."
We insist that there exists such a category, the "worst of
the worst," and that it can be known in several ways. Again,
let's point to some: Hitler, Swango, Bundy, Dahmer, Idi Amin,
Manson, McVeigh, Ng. and Rolling. We can point to them, and
we can define them as a class-especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.
We find support for the common understanding that some
crimes and criminals are worse than others in longstanding cul-
tural commitments. Going back thousands of years to the twin
sources of Western culture in both ancient Athens and in the
Old Testament in which homicide is different from other kinds
of crimes, accidental killings are distinguished from intentional
murders. In short, 2,500 years ago and today, not all killings
are alike. Some are worse than others. In the Old Testament,
one who kills another accidentally, or by today's standards neg-
ligently, is less bad than a reckless killer (although the bound-
ary between recklessness and aggravated depraved
recklessness is subtle and challenging). In the Old Testament,
a person who kills negligently or accidentally is permitted to
flee to cities of refuge, where he or she will be exempt from the
death penalty.64 Whereas one who kills intentionally is right-
fully the target of the blood avenger, the next of kin of the vic-
tim, and subject to being killed. 65 In short, for thousands of
years, since its infancy, Western Culture has recognized that
not all killings are alike.
Of course, that assumes the even more incontrovertible
idea that not all crimes are alike and of equal moral gravity.
Murder is worse than petty theft. This is not because of how we
define things. The mass murdering rapist is worse than the
petty thief not because we say he is. He is simply worse. We
say he's worse because he is worse. Really, objectively.
However arbitrary abolitionists will try to make it, there's
moral truth to the "worst of the worst." At the end of the eight-
64. See Deuteronomy 19:4.
65. See Deuteronomy 19:11-12.
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eenth century, 2,300 years after the ancient Hebrews and the
ancient Greeks declared basic distinctions among homicides
and acted on them, Pennsylvania first divided murder into de-
grees. This new first degree murder was composed of premedi-
tated and felony murder for which alone the death penalty was
reserved.6 6 It was crude and underdeveloped, but it was a step
forward.
Is the death penalty constitutional under the United States
Constitution? According to the original intent of the ratifiers, it
is undeniably constitutional. The First Congress, largely drawn
from those in Philadelphia, enacted the first criminal code and
included the death penalty, even for crimes other than mur-
der.67 This is primary evidence that the Framers intended that
there be a death penalty. The Fifth Amendment clearly antici-
pates a death penalty. 68 It does not command it, but it antici-
pates and assumes it. So, if one is guided by original intent,
unquestionably the death penalty is constitutional for the"worst of the worst," however poorly and broadly defined are
those most pernicious criminals.
But standards of decency can evolve, and "cruel and unu-
sual" can acquire new meaning. We mature. As well as deny-
ing objective standards, the Sophists also stood for progress. 69
The United States Supreme Court also embraced that idea of"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society."70 Nobody concerned with human dignity in this
culture today would embrace either the initial categories of
death penalty offenses as propounded by that First Congress or
the Old Testament itself. Some of these past death penalty of-
fenses were worshiping a different God,7 1 committing adul-
tery, 72 engaging in consensual sodomy, 73 and disrespecting one's
66. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1954: REPORT 485-86
(1953).
67. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112; §§ 3, 8, 1 Stat. 113-14; § 14, 1
Stat. 115; see Roy K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some
Thoughts About the Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347
(1999).
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. See WILLIAM KEITH CHAMBERS GUTHRIE, THE SOPHISTS 242 (Cambridge
Univ. Press ed., 1971).
70. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
71. See Deuteronomy 17:1-6.
72. See Leviticus 20:11.
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parents74 (upon consideration, maybe that one's riot so bad). No
one seriously would embrace them today as offenses punishable
by death. In fact the United States Supreme Court has de-
clared they are not punishable at all. 75
So we know there exists the "worst of the worst," that we
are out to find it, that it is real, that we have a responsibility to
act on it, and yet, all the while we are progressively knowing it
better.
Let me be clear. One can acknowledge that the "worst of
the worst" is real, as does the Columbia Study,76 without sup-
porting the death penalty. One can even take the next step,
which I expect many abolitionists secretly do, and acknowledge
that some people are so evil, so vicious, so monstrous that they
do deserve to die, without embracing a correlative obligation of
society to kill them. Many abolitionists simply do not trust the
State to do it right. Whatever the government gets involved in,
including the death business, it inevitably screws up, they say.
Since we are talking about something as solemn as the value of
human life, we can't trust the government to take it. I find this
a helpful caution, but ultimately a cynical rejection of
government.
So, I hope we do engage in a dialogue about this here to-
night. Searching for the "worst of the worst," reserving
whatever the worst punishment that society may have, whether
it is life, life without parole, or death, for those "worst of the
worst" is a real requirement for a system of justice, however
problematic at the periphery.
The problem is compound. "Worst of the worst," although
real, is ambiguous. "Worst of the worst" what? The "worst of
the worst" crimes, or the "worst of the worst" criminals? Which
is it? Who is it that deserves to die? Reference was made to the
Illinois report.77 The Illinois report points out that a substan-
tial minority "favoring the death penalty believe it retains an
73. See Leviticus 20:14.
74. See Exodus 21:18.
75. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
76. See generally Columbia Study II, supra note 40; cf. Robert Blecker &
James S. Liebman, Common Ground: Let's Break the Impasse on Death Penalty,
Hous. CHRON., May 25, 2003 (where James Liebman, the Columbia Study's lead
author, joins me in acknowledging this reality) (on file with the author).
77. Illinois Report, supra note 38.
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important role in our punishment scheme in expressing, on be-
half of the community, the strongest possible condemnation of a
small number of the most heinous crimes."78 Professor Michael
Radelet was commissioned as part of this to study whether "the
death penalty was being applied to the 'worst' offenders . . .79
So is it offenses, offenders, crimes or criminals when we talk
about the "worst of the worst?"
We should untangle the ambiguity in my view, as we do
now: In the first trial during the guilt or innocence phase, our
focus is on the crime, and that's what makes a person death
eligible. Then we move onto the penalty phase, where the focus
is upon the person and the character. Now, I know traditionally
many devout Christians maintain after St. Augustine that we
should "hate the fault and love the man."8 0 It violates human
nature in the extreme to continue to love a mass murdering rap-
ist; it forces us to abandon so much at the core of our culture.
Our experience in the world forces us to confront vicious
predators who destroy and denigrate human life with an atti-
tude incommensurately cruel and callous. One hates the sinner
in large part because of the sin. The vice, the viciousness
reveals character by action. Acts and attitudes make up charac-
ter, and a man's character, as Heraclitus said wisely in the
sixth century, B.C., "is his fate."81
That which we ultimately condemn when we condemn the"worst of the worst" is the person, the character-who he or she
is-which we know through this and other acts and attitudes.
The "worst of the worst" are bad, really bad.
Major studies correctly urge us to shrink the aggravating
circumstances so that we reduce the number of death eligibles.
We should vastly reduce death row from the present 3,500 or
so. 8 2 Probably 80% are not really the "worst of the worst." They
are murderers, they are guilty, they are bad, they have done
terrible things, but they are not the "worst of the worst." The
78. Id. at pbml. iii (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 7.
80. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 14:6 (Henry Bettenson trans., Penguin
ed. 1984).
81. KAHN, supra note 49, at 81.
82. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ
201848, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2002 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp02.pdf.
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other 20% also do not belong on death row; they should be dead.
So, we have to resolve in our own minds, if we are committed to
marking the "worst of the worst," to what are we committed?
It's not enough to define the crime; we are also committed to
defining the person. In doing that, we cannot ultimately be con-
fined by a rational set of categories.
Here, again, Heraclitus was right: To capture flux and flow
and progress as mathematicians have shown us, requires more
than the rational. Reason alone is not enough. We need not so
much an irrational as a non-rational richer language. We need
emotion for a real idea of who deserves to die. The categories
should limit us, but discretion to decide who lives or dies must
be based on informed emotion, or "reflective intuition" as some
moral philosophers call it.83
Ultimately, the question of the death penalty is a moral
question, and every moral question is at its base an emotional
question. So, the "worst of the worst" are real; we can know
them; we can be certain that they deserve to die. But we can
only be certain because we feel certain. We can know those who
deserve to die only by using a richer language of informed emo-
tion. I am prepared to get specific about who they are and hope
we will focus there.
Norman L. Greene
Our next speaker will be Jeffrey Kirchmeier.
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier
I guess I will recommend David Von Drehle's book too.84 I
have read it, and it is an excellent book. I have recommended it
to several people.
I have to start with the process of the death penalty system.
I cannot completely ignore the process issue, because my jour-
ney with the death penalty began with it. At one time if you
had asked me, like Professor Blecker, I would have said that I
was in favor of the death penalty. When I graduated from law
school, I would have probably said that I was in favor of the
death penalty. I would like to think I that have become smarter
since that time, though I am not always sure if that is true.
83. See Hussey, supra note 51.
84. VON DREHLE, supra note 42.
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I became involved with the death penalty when working for
a large law firm, in Washington, D.C., on a pro bono case that
the firm was handling. That leads me to another commercial
break, because I also should say that if anyone is interested in
finding out more about how your firm can get involved in doing
a capital case, you should contact Norman Greene or me at the
Committee on Capital Punishment of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, because there are a lot of capital de-
fendants around the country who need representation.
Anyway, my first exposure to the death penalty, at the law
firm, raised a lot of procedural concerns for me. That experi-
ence was one of the reasons I eventually left to do death penalty
cases full-time. Among my concerns about the death penalty
were the racial compositions of death rows and the fact that
often the sentence depends upon the race of the victim. Racial
disparity is the concern that recently led Maryland to adopt a
moratorium on executions, to look further at that problem.8 5
Additionally, the death penalty is used predominantly on the
poor, whether they are the "worst of the worst" or not.8 6 Clinton
Duffy, a former warden of St. Quentin said, "The death penalty
is the privilege of the poor,"87 and that's true. Prosecutorial dis-
cretion results in not necessarily always finding the "worst of
the worst." The fact that the defendants are poor often results
in poor representation, attorney's errors, etc.
The firm where I worked handled a case that had substan-
tial evidence of innocence but the previous lawyers had filed a
notice of appeal one day late. Later, the courts would not look
at that evidence because of the missed deadline.88 There are
several examples like that. Recently, the Illinois Commission
on Capital Punishment came up with recommendations for re-
forming the death penalty because of concerns with problems in
the system.8 9 Professor Fagan's report, which I am sure he will
85. Lori Montgomery, Maryland Suspends Death Penalty; Glendenning
Awaits Report on Racial Bias In Murder Prosecutions, WASH. POST, May 10, 2002,
at Al.
86. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
87. IAN GRAY & STANLEY MOIRA, PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME: AMERI-
CANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 191 (1989).
88. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
89. See Illinois Report, supra note 38.
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talk about, also points out some of the problems with the sys-
tem. 90 It is just the way the system works. It is set up now to
try to get the "worst of the worst," but it does not achieve that.
It gets the "unluckiest of the worst," or maybe the "unluckiest of
the unlucky" in the cases where the defendants are innocent.
Tonight, unless something drastic happened while Profes-
sor Blecker was talking, Johnny Martinez was executed in
Texas, while we were sitting in this room.9 ' His victim's family
was against his execution, and the clemency board voted nine to
eight to let the execution go forward.92 So by one vote the deter-
mination was made as to whether someone lives or dies. One
different person on the panel would result in a totally different
outcome. It's not the "worst of the worst," it's the "unluckiest of
the worst."
So the question raised by Professor Blecker is whether we
can fix the system if we narrow down the category of those we
execute. Even though the system is already designed to get the"worst of the worst," maybe if we change it so that we have an
even smaller group that we will call the "worst of the worst," it
will fix everything.
Throughout history, the goal always has been to get the
"worst of the worst." When England executed pickpockets, they
thought they were getting the "worst of the worst."93 When we
developed a system where all homicide defendants were exe-
cuted in England, 94 then that system found the "worst of the
worst." But then we evolved, and we developed our current
death penalty system, of not executing all killers, but only exe-
cuting murderers with certain aggravating factors. And that
resulted, as Professor Blecker mentioned, with more than 3,500
people on death rows across the United States. 95 That is so
many condemned people that if we did not sentence anyone else
to death and executed one a day for the next nine years, we still
90. See Columbia Study II, supra note 40.
91. Johnny Martinez was executed that night. See Diane Jennings, Killer Ex-
ecuted After Giving Thanks to Mother of Victim, Woman Who Sought Commutation
of his Sentence Doesn't Attend, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 23, 2003, at A29.
92. See id.
93. See CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 386-87 (1st ed. 1993).
94. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1975).
95. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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would not be able to execute everybody currently on death row
in the United States.
The questions are whether we can come up with a more
limited system to get a smaller category of the condemned and
will such a system work? I guess I am in favor of having fewer
executions. Yet, I see three problems with designing a system
that would give us a smaller category of condemned and expect-
ing that system to cure all of the current problems with the
death penalty. First, politically, there is not a will for narrow-
ing the death penalty. Second, there is still the difficulty of
drawing the lines as to who are now the new group of the "worst
of the worst." The third problem is the arbitrariness-which I
assume is going to be discussed by Professor Fagan later 96-
that is still in the system. These problems would not necessa-
rily be eliminated.
The first problem is the political difficulty in coming up
with a smaller category of cases for the death penalty. Martin
Leahy mentioned the new Gallup poll showing that the general
population seems to want more executions, 97 and that is the
way it works in the legislatures too. Because the death penalty
is a political issue and not a criminal justice issue, over the
years politicians and legislators tend to expand the number of
death penalty crimes instead of condensing the number.
In 1999, five states broadened their death penalty statutes
or added aggravating circumstances to include more people.98
In 1998, five states broadened their death penalty statutes.9 9 In
1997 six states broadened their statutes, in 1996 again six
states, and in 1995 nine states.100 And that is not counting New
York, which added the death penalty in 1995 with ten aggravat-
96. See generally infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
98. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ
184795, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1999 2-3 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp99.pdf.
99. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ
179012, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1998 2-3 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp98.pdf.
100. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No.
NCJ 172881, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1997 2-3 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp97.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, BULL. No. NCJ 167031, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1996 2-3 (1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp96.pdf, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
[Vol. 24:107
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY
ing factors, which are now twelve aggravating factors. 10 1 In
1994, seven states broadened their death penalty statutes, in
1993 again seven states, etc. 102 Once society makes the decision
that some people are going to be executed and that some people
are deserving of death, it is impossible for legislators to draw
the line. How do you compare one victim's family to another
and say that one family is deserving of having the perpetrator
killed and this other family is not deserving of such vengeance?
Difficulty with actually defining the "worst of the worst" is
a current problem with the system too. The Supreme Court has
said that guiding factors in categorizing who are the "worst of
the worst," called "aggravating factors," must be clear and not
vague, in order to give guidance to the sentencers. 10 3 But legis-
lators have had difficulty in drafting clear factors. One aggra-
vating factor that legislators have developed as an attempt to
define the worst crimes has different formulations in different
states, but it is often called the "heinous, atrocious or cruel"10 4
or "heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating factor. 10 5 Thus, if a
crime is "heinous," then that is one that meets the standard to
qualify for the death penalty. However, the aggravating factor
has been used broadly, contrary to the Supreme Court's holding
that states cannot execute every murderer, only the "worst"
ones.10 6 With these types of vague aggravating factors, the
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ 162043, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1995 2-3 (1996),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp95.pdf.
101. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2003).
102. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No.
NCJ 158023, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1994 2-3 (1996), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp94.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, BULL. No. NCJ 150042, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1993 (1994), available at http:!
/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/cp93.txt.
103. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (striking down the use of a
vague aggravating circumstance that did not provide "clear and objective stan-
dards" to the sentencer) (citation omitted).
104. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(8) (1999) ("The capital offense was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses .... "); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(6) (1990) ("The defendant committed the crime in an espe-
cially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.").
105. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(6) (2003) ("The defendant commit-
ted the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner .... "); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(i)(4) (2001) ("The defendant committed the offense in an es-
pecially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner . . ").
106. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Par-
adox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. &
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courts have not been able to distinguish between which homi-
cide is heinous and which is not. 10 7 Obviously, all homicides are
horrible, so how do you say that some are especially heinous,
cruel or depraved and some are not?
Another way the courts have tried to define the "worst of
the worst" is to say that if someone is a future danger to society,
we will execute them. That aggravating factor is why Johnny
Martinez is getting executed today in Texas; he was found to be
a future danger even though he had no prior convictions for any
type of violence.108 Mental health experts agree that you cannot
predict future dangerousness and that has been borne out in
practice too, where people in juries have tried to predict future
dangerousness. 109 Again, all current statutes are an attempt to
predict who are the "worst of the worst." Yet, the statutes nec-
essarily end up being broad and including a large number of
killers, and that is why we have ended up with so many people
on death row in the United States.
The third problem in coming up with a narrow group of the"worst of the worst" murderers is that even if you come up with
a smaller group than we have now, you will still have arbitrari-
ness within the system. Even if you make the categories
smaller, you will still end up, within that category, having dis-
cretion and arbitrariness. By making it a smaller group, you
certainly will limit the available discretion, so I commend Pro-
fessor Blecker in his attempt to try to limit discretion. 110 How-
ever, even then you still will have an area where you are going
to have discretion, because you allow prosecutors discretion in
deciding whom to prosecute, you allow non-statutory aggravat-
ing factors to be considered, and you allow all mitigation to be
MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 360-68 (1998) (discussing use of the especially heinous ag-
gravating factor) [hereinafter Aggravating and Mitigating Factors]; see also God-
frey, 446 U.S. at 428; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
107. See Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 106, at 364-68 (dis-
cussing inconsistencies in the application of the "especially heinous" aggravating
circumstance).
108. See Martinez v. Texas, 924 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding 5-
4 that facts of homicide were sufficient by themselves to support a finding of "fu-
ture dangerousness" without evidence of prior criminal activity by the defendant).
109. See Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 106, at 368-74 (dis-
cussing criticisms of the broad "future danger" aggravating circumstance).
110. See supra p. 130-31.
[Vol. 24:107
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY
considered. 1 ' The Supreme Court has stated that once you find
someone qualified for the death penalty, you can consider these
other types of factors. 112 For example, the consideration of vic-
tim impact evidence, which focuses on the homicide's effects on
the victim's family, 1 3 may affect who gets the death penalty de-
pending on the status of the victim.
So, in summary, there are these three main practical
problems with narrowing the group of those we execute as a
cure for the problems with the death penalty. They are: (1) the
political problems in being able to accomplish this narrowing;
(2) the problems with being able to define this new narrower
version of the "worst of the worst" adequately and constitution-
ally; and (3) that problems of arbitrary discretion will still be
there within the system. These are major obstacles to fixing the
system by coming up with a smaller category. Again, I think we
can improve the death penalty system, but you still end up with
a system where you are getting, to some extent, the "unluckiest
of the worst," instead of necessarily, the "worst of the worst."
Next, today's topic also asked about the morality of the
death penalty. In looking at the moral aspects of the death pen-
alty, I am not an expert on morality, so I am not going to stand
up here and say that I am. Philosophers and religions disagree
on the death penalty. Obviously, your morality has to come
from your own self. Figure out what your moral basis is and
what you believe in. But I will tell you what happened to me on
my journey.
When I left the law firm to go do death penalty work full-
time in Arizona, I went to an organization that handled capital
cases all through the system. All the cases that were near exe-
cution would be given to us because other attorneys did not
want to handle them. Even at that time, I would say that I was
not necessarily morally opposed to the death penalty, but I was
opposed to it because of the procedural concerns and problems.
111. See Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 106, at 360-91 (dis-
cussing some of the arbitrariness inherent in the current death penalty system).
112. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (holding that it does
not violate the Constitution for a sentencer to consider nonstatutory aggravating
factors after finding at least one statutory aggravating factor).
113. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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That was the reason I left D.C. to go work on capital cases full-
time.
In each case that I examined, I looked at the facts of the
case and saw how horrible they were. All these cases are horri-
ble and there is no way of getting around that. I would think of
the victims and the suffering and my first reaction would gener-
ally be "well, maybe this is the one defendant who deserves to
be executed." Then I would begin to look at other things that
were going on with the death penalty.
One of the things that first made me question the penalty
as a solution is seeing how people close to the defendants were
affected by it. Albert Camus said that "the relatives of the con-
demned man . . . discover an excess of suffering that punishes
them beyond all justice,"11 4 and I found that to be true. I saw
first-hand how families on both sides would suffer through the
process. Members of one client's family had to listen to people
cheering outside their hotel while their loved-one was being ex-
ecuted. I sat with the mother of a defendant-a mother who
tried all through her life to prevent her self-destructive son
from committing suicide-and I was with her as her son was
being executed. He had committed murder and gave up all of
his appeals, and that was the one way he finally could get his
wish to commit suicide. At the funeral of another client, one of
his, my client's, small nephews, trying to understand why his
healthy uncle was now dead, went up to his mother and asked,
"They killed Uncle Luis on purpose, didn't they?" Without
meaning to compare the impact of murder and executions on
different victims, seeing the impact on the innocent relatives of
the condemned made me question the morality of the death
penalty, which seemed to add more suffering in the world.
Another moral problem that I saw is the issue of whether,
even with a better legal system, human beings can ever actually
know who are the "worst of the worst." Criminologists and
mental health professionals often recognize the role of a per-
son's background in contributing to violence. Especially when
you get to the most heinous cases, the most bizarre murders,
and the crimes that we cannot comprehend, you will see that
114. Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION,
AND DEATH 205 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1961).
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the defendants in these cases are often brain damaged, victims
of childhood sexual and violent abuse, etc. This information
raises the question that maybe these defendants are not the"worst of the worst," but the "sickest of the sick." A psychiatrist
and professor from NYU and Yale, Dr. Dorothy Lewis, who has
worked with a number of death row inmates describes her
experience:
We found ourselves ... in the company of a pathetic crew of intel-
lectually limited, dysfunctional, half-mad, occasionally explosive
losers. Long before these men wound up on death row, their par-
ents.., battered them. They used them sexually. They sold their
child bodies to buddies in exchange for drugs or food or money.
They neglected them. Sometimes they even tried to kill them ....
It was a drama generations in the making. The mothers and fa-
thers of our subjects held their children out of the open windows
of moving cars; they set them on fire; they had shot at them; they
slashed them with knifes and machetes. But in spite of their ef-
forts to destroy them, the children had lived to adulthood. They
had lived to perpetuate on others the violence that had been vis-
ited upon them. 15
Studies support this analysis, and you can see it in specific
cases. We had a client with severe brain damage, who-when
he was sixteen-years-old and had never been violent-was put
into an adult prison where he was beaten and raped on a regu-
lar basis. He came out a violent and different person. Another
executed client was mentally retarded, and when he was born
his family thought he brought them bad luck, so he was se-
verely abused as a child and that is where he learned about vio-
lence. Further, in neither of these cases did the courts consider
that background evidence because of poor trial attorneys and
subsequent procedural barriers to raising the claims.
The fact that not all mitigating evidence actually is consid-
ered is one of the moral failings of the death penalty. The Su-
preme Court has stated that the backgrounds of capital
defendants are morally and legally relevant, as Professor
Blecker pointed out, in determining who are the worst offend-
115. DOROTHY OTNow LEWIS, GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST
PROBES THE MINDS OF KILLERS 188 (1998).
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ers. 116 So in deciding whom to execute we are not just looking
for the worst crimes, but we are looking for the "worst" individu-
als. If you try to determine who are the worst defendants, then
this type of background information has to be considered. The
Supreme Court said that you have to consider any aspect of the
defendant's character that is relevant in a case called Lockett v.
Ohio.117
This mitigating evidence does not excuse the violence that
occurs later, but it helps explain it, and-for both legal and
moral purposes-it has to be weighed in the process of deter-
mining who are the "worst of the worst" defendants. Yet, be-
cause we never know everything about the defendant in the
complete moral sense, one cannot determine exactly who is the"worst of the worst." You cannot truly find the complete indi-
vidualized sentencing that the Supreme Court says that we
should have.118 If we are supposed to consider the entire per-
son, who the entire person is, then we cannot consider that en-
tire person when this information is lost or it is found too late.
In those cases that I mentioned, we found the mitigating
evidence long after the original attorneys did not find it, and by
then the courts would not consider it because it was too late. A
lot of times this type of evidence regarding a defendant's fam-
ily's background is not in The Daily News, and it is going to be
difficult to find, and maybe impossible to find if witnesses are
dead. The problem is that even with an ideal legal system, one
is not able ever to get the whole moral picture of a person in
these cases.
So the question becomes a moral one for us about how we
treat these individuals. What does it say about us when we
make a decision based on incomplete information in deciding to
take a life? When the death penalty was debated in the House
of Lords in England, Lord Chancellor Gardiner stated: "When
we abolished the punishment for treason that you should be
hanged, and then cut down while still alive, and then disem-
boweled while still alive, and then quartered, we did not abolish
116. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments require individualized consideration of mitigating
circumstances).
117. Id.
118. See id.
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the punishment because we sympathized with traitors, but be-
cause we took the view that it was a punishment no longer con-
sistent with our self respect."119 And that's the moral question:
What does the death penalty say about us when we make deci-
sions to kill a human being based on incomplete information?
We know our initial reactions and feelings, but we do not really
know the individual.
In conclusion, as I mentioned earlier, the normal reaction
for me in these cases was to see how horrendous the crimes
were and to think that maybe the defendants deserved to be
executed. In one of those cases, in the mid-1990's, I saw pic-
tures of the victim, a woman who had been brutally murdered
and saw that there was what seemed like convincing evidence
against the defendant. At the time, I thought maybe that was
one case where the defendant deserved to be executed. Well,
last month that defendant, who had been on death row since
then, was proved innocent by DNA evidence, and he was ab-
solved of the crime and released. So I look at myself and I see
that I am not capable of determining who is the "worst of the
worst." I cannot make that decision. If I had been a juror in
Karla Faye Tucker's case I would not have known that she
would eventually turn her life around.120 Had I been a juror in
Wilbert Evans' case, in Virginia, when the jurors decided that
he was a future danger, I would not have known at that time
that three months later he would save the lives of several
guards on death row.' 2'
The decision to kill is a moral decision we are making on
incomplete information. Because human beings are a mystery,
we cannot see the whole complete human. We cannot know
with complete certainty what happened in the past and who is
119. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972) (quoting 268 PARL.
DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1965) 703).
120. For a further discussion of Karla Faye Tucker's case, see Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Move-
ment in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 49-51 (2002).
121. After Wilbert Evans was sentenced to death in March 1984, in Virginia,
for the shooting of a deputy sheriff because jurors determined he was a future
danger, Mr. Evans saved the lives of several hostages and prevented the rape of a
nurse during a riot at the prison. See Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating
Factors, supra note 106 at 372-74. The courts would not consider this new evi-
dence, and Mr. Evans was executed in Virginia's electric chair on October 17, 1990.
See id. at 373-74.
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the "worst of the worst." Although we do have a moral right to
protect ourselves and to punish people, we do not have a moral
obligation to kill people-especially when we are dealing with
an imperfect system that kills the people who are the "unlucki-
est of the worst," the "sickest of the sick," or in the innocence
cases, the "unluckiest of the unlucky." Thank you.
Norman L. Greene
Our next speaker is Jeffrey Fagan, a Professor of Law and
Public Health at Columbia University. He is a criminologist,
but not a lawyer. He is also one of the scholars who partici-
pated in a Columbia Law School study, which is popularly
known by the name of only one of its authors, Professor James
Liebman, as the "Liebman Report," without reference to the
other authors. In deference to the other authors, we have de-
cided tonight to call it the "Columbia Study." This is the study,
which Martin referred to, showing that 68% of convictions in
death cases between 1973 and 1995 have been reversed. 122
Jeffrey Fagan
Thanks to the Association of the Bar for inviting me to join
this Symposium. It's only the Liebman Study when they want
to attack Jim; it's the Columbia Study when they want to cite it
favorably. Judge Rakoffs order in the Quinones123 decision in-
cluded comments that were very flattering to our study. He ac-
corded it a level of scientific validity and status as evidence.
Although we were grateful for his recognition, Judge Rakoff ex-
ceeded the limits of scientific and statistical inference in citing
our work in a federal case. That is, the probative value of our
study for Quinones was limited to death sentences in state
courts; there were no federal cases in our study. Nevertheless,
there are some enduring lessons from our study that may have
relevance for the future of federal death penalty jurisprudence
and practice.
There is a legendary story that circulates from time to time
concerning the influence of the social science evidence on racial
discrimination in the application of the death penalty that was
122. See Columbia Study II, supra note 40, at 8.
123. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 24:107142
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY
introduced in McCleskey, 124 in 1987. In McCleskey, the Su-
preme Court narrowly avoided overturning the federal death
penalty statute on equal protection grounds. The vote was five
to four and Justice O'Connor apparently was really quite unde-
cided about how to vote until the very last minute. The Justices
were challenged by the complex social science evidence-a
study done by Professor David Baldus125-about racial discrimi-
nation in the application of the death penalty in Georgia. This
was an extremely complex and sophisticated study whose tech-
nical details were inaccessible to the Justices. According to this
story, had the scientific evidence been more accessible, and
were Justice O'Connor better able to understand its validity
and full implications, she would have voted differently. 126
With this in mind, my goal tonight is to make our 617 pages
accessible to you as an audience of lawyers, judges and hope-
fully some future judges. But, I think more importantly, I want
to establish the factual basis for the most important public pol-
icy debate that I believe we can have in this country. In the
Columbia study, we examined errors. We did not analyze the
imposition of the death penalty, racial disparity, or executions.
Instead, we asked how often, why, and in what places, were
death sentences reversed?
We studied errors for two primary reasons; the first is that
high error rates signify a dysfunctional system. We discovered
that high error rates were in fact not the problem of a few juris-
dictions that are atypical along any social or legal dimension,
but actually were quite common and widespread among death
sentencing states across the country. 127 The error rates range
from zero in some places 28 to 100% in a small number of states
that are just starting out on the path of the death penalty.129
Such persistently high error rates have a contaminating effect
on popular evaluations of thejegitimacy of the law, and the le-
124. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
125. See id. at 286-87.
126. See generally EDWARD LAzARuS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWIT-
NESS ACcOUNT OF THE Epic STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 182-217 (1998).
127. Columbia Study II, supra note 40, at 48.
128. Virginia's reversal rate of 13.4% ranked twenty-ninth in the country. See
id. at 68-69. "This could mean there are disturbingly low rates of error detection
... [or] commendably low rates of error . . . ." Id. at 68; see also id. at 389-90.
129. See id. at 48-69.
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gitimacy of the legal institutions that enforce the laws. Or as
George Will said, "[c]apital punishment, like the rest of the
criminal justice system, is [just another] government program
.... 1)130 High error rates also are important because as the Su-
preme Court,131 and several of the panelists, have noted, death
is different; death is different both in terms of the commission of
death by an offender, and in the state's role in imposing a death
sentence and the possibility of taking the offender's life. The
second reason for studying error is the horrifying specter of
wrongful execution. As I describe the study, you will see how
this nightmare haunts the administration of the death penalty
and the normative views that animate it.
The study itself is a fairly simple to describe. What did we
ask? We asked how much error is there in capital sentencing,
where does error occur, when does error occur, and what factors
can explain the patterns of error that we observed, both within
states over time, and between states and over time generally?
What did we do? We reviewed every single death sentence that
was handed down following the Furman132 decision in 1972. We
examined the outcome of each case at each of three stages of
review: direct appeal, post-conviction review in state appellate
courts, and federal habeas corpus review. Using contemporary
social science theory and methods, we tested whether a series of
social and legal factors that are related to the use of the death
penalty itself in states and counties, also predicted the inci-
dence of error and variations in errors both in states and coun-
ties.133  These predictors included the social structure
characteristics of states and counties, and the performance and
behavior of the criminal justice system. 34
We also examined the results of habeas appeals, where in-
formation was available on the details of the offense, the of-
fender, the victim's social status, the crime itself, the
130. George F. Will, Op-Ed, Innocent of Death Row, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2000,
at A23.
131. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind."); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
132. 408 U.S. 238.
133. See Columbia Study II, supra note 40, at 137-41 tbl.2.
134. Id.
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background of the judge and defense attorneys, and several ad-
ditional contextual factors, including aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors. 135 What methods did we use? We used both simple
arithmetic-tabular methods-and complex multivariate sta-
tistical analyses using econometric models. First, we simply
counted errors over time within states, and within counties.
Second, we used econometric models to estimate models that
would explain the combinations of factors that predict error
rates within states and counties over time. To identify factors
that produced these errors, we used a multivariate analytic
methods including negative binomial and overdispersed Poisson
regression, with very specific error terms and offsets to adjust
the estimates both for time and for the supply of death penalty
cases. 136
Despite the complexity of the statistical procedures, we ac-
tually asked a very simple question: Did the error rate in a
state rise over and above that level that would be predicted sim-
ply by knowing the number of death sentences in that state?
What we found was that very often it did, and we were able to
identify several social, legal and political factors that either in-
creased error rates above what would be predicted from the
death sentencing and murder rates, or factors that kept error
rates low. 137
The findings suggest that the system is indeed "broken."
Our analysis of more than 4,600 death sentences showed that
68% (better than two out of three) were reversed overall. 138 At
direct appeal, 41% were reversed; 10% were reversed at state
post conviction review, and 40% were reversed at federal
habeas review. 39 Summing across cases, more than two in
three, or 68%, were reversed. 40 What happened to the cases
that were reversed? Most (82%) were re-sentenced to non-capi-
135. Id.
136. See id. at 99-117; see also WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
(5th ed. 2002).
137. See generally Columbia Study II, supra note 40.
138. Id. at 8-9.
139. Id. at 8; see also JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, from 1973 through 1995 1973-1995, 34-35 (2000), availa-
ble at http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/finrep.PDF [hereinafter Columbia
Study].
140. Columbia Study, supra note 139, at 35.
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tal sentences; 11% were ultimately executed, and 7% were exon-
erated on actual innocence grounds.14' The trial and appeal
processes were lengthy. It took approximately nine years from
sentence to execution, and slightly more time (approximately
eleven years) from sentence to reversal, for those that were fi-
nally released or re-sentenced to something less than death.142
The political neutrality of reversal was noteworthy. Most
reversals-more than 90%-were decided by elected judges
with no or very little political incentive to reverse a death sen-
tence. 143 Ninety-five percent of the reversals were made either
by elected judges or judges who were appointed by conservative,
Republican Presidents, since 1972.'4
The causes of error are alarming. We identified three main
causes of error. The most common was ineffective assistance of
counsel; about one in three reversals was caused by incompe-
tent defense lawyering. The errors were not simply "technicali-
ties," such as late filings. Instead, we found lawyers
committing such errors as failing to raise substantive issues re-
lating to mitigation or exoneration, or to cross-examine key
prosecution witnesses. 145 The second most common cause of er-
ror was judicial bias, both in jury instructions and by plain er-
ror in the way judges interpreted and applied the law. 146 Most
alarming, we found that nearly one in five reversals (19%) oc-
curred because of prosecutorial or police misconduct, such as
concealing exculpatory evidence from the defense. 147
The primary cause of error rates in death sentences was
the lack of selectivity in seeking the death penalty. "The higher
the rate at which a state or county imposes death verdicts [for
homicide], the greater the probability that [a] death verdict will
have to be reversed because of serious error."148 In other words,
the high rate of capital prosecutions and sentences, well beyond
what would be predicted from the homicide rate, suggested that
wrathful prosecutors were indiscriminate in their application of
141. See id. at 7.
142. See id. at 47.
143. See id. at 11.
144. See id. at 68-70.
145. Columbia Study, supra note 139, at 6.
146. See id. at 6-7 and accompanying notes.
147. Id. at 6-7.
148. Id. at ii.
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the death penalty. Their blood lust produced very high rates of
error. That is, death sentencing rates that are slightly above
the national average produce error rates that are nearly double
(43%, compared to 23%) the average error rate across the coun-
try. When you increase the death sentencing rate by 10% above
the national average for seeking the death penalty, the error
rate triples (74%, compared to 23%). 149 Plainly, we seek the
death penalty too often.
The second source of error was another manifestation of the
indiscriminate use of the death penalty. "[T]he more often
states impose death sentences in cases" where there were no
aggravating factors, or no highly aggravating factors, again,
"the higher the risk of error."150 We found that "[flor each addi-
tional aggravating factor, the probability of reversal drops by
about 15%, when other conditions are held constant . .. ."151
Next, we identified two disturbing signs that social dynamics
and social conflict more generally produced higher rates of er-
ror. First, when the ratio of white homicide victims to black
homicide victims in a state and in a county approaches equality,
the risk of error rates in death sentences imposed in that locale
is twice as high as compared to when there is less of a bal-
ance. 15 2 Second, we showed that "[tihe higher the proportion of
African-Americans living in a state-and in one analysis, the
more welfare recipients in a state-the higher the rate of seri-
ous capitol error."153
We also noted protective factors that lowered the rate of er-
ror in death sentences. States with more effective and efficient
criminal justice systems, those that are able to detect and pun-
ish all forms of crime efficiently and at relatively a high rate as
compared to other states, produced fewer errors. 54 It appears
then, that the death sentencing system in the United States is a
compensatory system that may be used to cosmetically conceal
the flaws in general trends of criminal justice and punishment.
We also found that political pressure is a very important factor.
149. Id. at 183.
150. Columbia Study, supra note 139, at ii.
151. Id.
152. Id. at iii.
153. Id. at iii
154. See Columbia Study II, supra note 40, at iii.
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"The more often and directly state trial judges are subject to
popular election, and the more partisan those elections are,
[again using standard social science measures,] the higher the
state's rate of serious capital error."1 55
Among individual or case-level factors, we did not detect ra-
cial imbalances, after controlling statistically for a large num-
ber of factors. 156 We did find racial imbalance in the aggregate,
in terms of the racial dynamics of the states and counties. 5 7 We
found states with fewer resources for defense counsel produce
death sentences that are more often reversed, far more often. 158
We found quite simply and understandably and predictably,
that good lawyers are critical to detecting reversible error at the
federal habeas stage.159
We drew several implications from this study. We find that
the prosecutors are very often, disturbingly, party to, if not per-
petrators of, error. 160 We find that legislators throughout this
political land are the primary beneficiaries of the blood lust and
zeal that motivates prosecutors to seek the death penalty at a
very high rate relative to the overall homicide rate. 1 1 Citizen
bear the brunt of this zeal: prosecutors "write checks" that citi-
zens have to cash in the form of extraordinary expenses in pur-
suing capital cases and then litigating appeals that last longer
than a decade, and often end up being overturned. Nobody wins
under the current system. We characterize prosecutorial mis-
behavior as an abuse of authority and ultimately a lack of ac-
countability; we think that's poisonous to democracy.
The "worst of the worst" argument is a policy prescription
that would minimize error rates. I say this with full acknowl-
edgement about the elasticity of the concept, as Jeffrey
Kirchmeier reminds us. The current system, though, produces
intolerably high rates of error and carries the extreme risk of a
wrongful execution. It would be preferable to define the "worst
of the worst" and confine the use of the death penalty to those
individuals, with vigilance in the policing of the boundaries that
155. Id.
156. Id. at 158-59.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 244.
159. Columbia Study II, supra note 40, at 315-18.
160. Id. at 84.
161. See generally id.
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define this category. We operationalize this policy in a fairly
simple way, and in a way that is preferable to the delegated
narrowing functions of current case law precisely because it
promises to open a broader deliberative process on the role of
the state in seeking death. We suggest that proof be required
beyond any doubt, not a reasonable doubt, but "beyond any
doubt that the defendant committed a capital crime."1 62 We
would require that aggravating factors substantially outweigh
mitigating factors, not just by one extra aggravator, but two or
even three. 163 We suggest that the death penalty be barred for
"defendants with inherently extenuating conditions-the men-
tally retarded persons, juveniles, [and] severely mentally ill de-
fendants."1 64 We think "[m]aking life imprisonment without
parole an alternative to the death penalty and clearly informing
juries of that option," would also reduce error.165 We suggest
abolishing judicial overrides of jury verdicts that impose life
sentences. 166 We suggest a "comparative review of murder
sentences to identify what counts as the 'worst of the worst' in
[each] state, and overturning outlying death verdicts,"1 67 a regu-
latory function that can be a vehicle for democratic deliberation
on death cases. We suggest "[b]asing charging decisions in po-
tentially capital cases on full and informed deliberations," 68
even transparent deliberations where the public becomes a
party, so that they can understand the internal machinery. We
suggest "[miaking all police and prosecution evidence bearing
on guilt vs. innocence, and on aggravation vs. mitigation, avail-
able to the jury at trial."1 69 This recommendation reflects the
principles articulated in Apprendi 70 and Ring,17' the law of the
land on capital sentencing. And, whenever possible, we suggest
"[i]nsulating capital-sentencing and appellate judges from polit-
ical pressure." 72 The last suggestion is to identify and appoint
162. Id. at v.
163. Id.
164. Columbia Study II, supra note 40, at v.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at vi.
168. Id.
169. Columbia Study II, supra note 40, at vi.
170. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
171. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
172. Columbia Study II, supra note 40, at vi.
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capital defense counsel in a manner that would attract well
qualified, well educated, well compensated, and experienced
lawyers to do this work. 173
Is there political will to implement these reforms, and re-
duce the unacceptably high rate of capital error? Admittedly,
implementation of these reforms would be politically complex
and demands will that the legislatures thus far have not shown.
The debate in the Illinois legislature following the release of the
Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment is
a cautionary tale: some recommendations were quickly adopted,
others sparked contentious debate that still persists. 174 But the
most important question is whether these reforms would miti-
gate error. Assume for the moment that they are implemented
with the level of efficiency and zeal that greet other reforms in-
troduced throughout the criminal justice system. In many
other cases, non-capital cases, errors persist. Will errors still
haunt and defy the system even under these tightened circum-
stances? This is an empirical question, and yes, we would like
to shift the debate there.
Norman L. Greene
I would like to make a few comments before I introduce Bill
Erlbaum, who is the next speaker. In all the programs that we
have sponsored, we have had few judges, and the ones we have
had have been rather circumspect. Bill Erlbaum has taught us
a lot, arguably some of which is counterintuitive. Among other
things, Bill has made it very clear that a judge has First
Amendment rights which he is free to exercise. We have had
very many private conversations, however, and therefore I have
some idea of his approach. I never found it to be a problem to
have a judge on the death penalty committee, but for a long
time it was hard to attract one. Now we have two judges. But
there is nothing inherent in being a judge requiring that one
stop being a scholar, stop being an interested person, and stop
being a citizen with full rights. I am very interested to hear
what Bill Erlbaum is going to say tonight on capital punish-
ment. Judge Bill Erlbaum.
173. Id.
174. See Illinois Report, supra note 38, at 107-206.
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Honorable William M. Erlbaum
Thank you and good evening. I am very pleased to be here.
I participate in this program as a member of the legal commu-
nity. I do not speak as a judge, nor does what I say have any
bearing upon any decision that I might make were an issue to
come before me as a judge. That is a distinction that is well
understood and relied upon. 175
The program includes the question of whether even a death
penalty limited to the "worst of the worst"176 would "be support-
175. See, e.g., Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Death Penalty: The Torah and Today,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 2000, at 2; Judge Judith S. Kaye, Lecture at the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York (Feb. 26, 1987), available at http://www.
courts.state.ny.us/history/elecbook/kaye-cardozo/pgl.htm; Mary Beth Pfeiffer,
Drug Treatment Successes Fall Short of Advocates' Goals, POUGHKEEPSIE J., Nov.
16, 2000, available at http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/projects/prison/
po111600s3.shtml (includes statement by then Judge George Marlow); Thomas
Healy, Death Penalty Support Drops as Debate Shifts, BALT. SUN, July 25, 2001, at
Al (includes statement by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor); Press Release, The Pew
Forum on Religion & Public Life, Scalia Calls Death Penalty Constitutional, "Not
Immoral": Supreme Court Justice Speaks on Religion, Politics and the Death Pen-
alty at Pew Forum Conference (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://pewforum.org/
press/index.php?ReleaseID=11; Justin Scott & Missy Maynarich, Death Penalty
Debate Revived, DAILY NEXUS, Jan. 28, 2003, at 1 (includes presentation by Judge
Alex Kozinski), available at http://www.dailynexus.comlnews/1969/4294.html; Ian
Urbina, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2003, at B1.
176. The category the "worst of the worst" is vague. Like an earlier formula-
tion, the "abandoned and malignant heart," it constitutes "not a standard but a
pseudo-standard... an invitation to arbitrariness and passion, or even to the in-
fluence of dark unconscious factors." Charles L. Black, Jr., Capital Punishment:
The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake, in THE LANAHAN READINGS IN CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 235-36 (David M. O'Brien ed., 2d ed. 2003). Professor
Robert Blecker, given his druthers, would add a new class of death-eligible defend-
ants from a group he describes as "red-collar killers-who maintain lethal work-
places or sell lethal products." Robert Blecker, Among Killers, Searching for the
Worst of the Worst, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2000, at B1. Blecker complains that, "cor-
porate executives who knowingly perpetuate dangerous conditions because of cost
considerations-Blecker cited Ford executives who declined to recall the Pinto af-
ter calculating that lawsuits resulting from potential deaths would be less expen-
sive than the recall-never face the death penalty." Rick Halperin, Death Penalty
News-USA/PENN., COLORADO, FLORIDA, at http://venus.soci.niu.edu/
-archives/ABOLISH/rick-halperin/marOO/0143.html (Mar. 29, 2000). Finally, to-
night, Blecker stated:
My first choice for who should die in this context is Robert Courtney, the
pharmacist in the Midwest, worth $10 million, who diluted chemotherapy to
3% strength which he distributed to cancer victims desperate for a cure.
This was a case of a pharmacist worth millions of dollars diluting cancer
patients' chemo for money. Can you imagine anything more depraved? It
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able morally, philosophically?" That is the main issue that I
will address, not whether there should be fewer executions. For
the abolitionist, reducing the number of people who are exe-
cuted is desirable in itself. I believe that the death penalty is
not ethically supportable for any criminal, not even for "moral
monsters" 177 like Hitler or Stalin.
A threshold question concerns who has the burden of proof
on this issue. The political status quo in America is that thirty-
eight states, the federal government, and the United States mil-
itary have established capital punishment.178 At first blush one
might conclude that the burden of proof is upon the abolitionist,
the side seeking a departure from that status quo. Here, how-
ever, we are not dealing with a political question but with an
ethical question: Ought we to have executions? We might rea-
sonably suppose that abolitionists, retributionists, and all of us
alike start this discussion on common ground: Respect for
human life and respect for justice. Retributionists, like Profes-
sor Robert Blecker, argue for the necessity of executing the
worst of the worst even in those jurisdictions which do not pres-
ently have the death penalty. Accordingly, the status quo in
those jurisdictions gives retributionists no support. From an
ethical standpoint, it would appear that the side that promotes
execution has the burden of demonstrating that the death pen-
alty is compatible with a proper respect for life and justice.
Apparently, Professor Blecker is prepared to assume that
burden. Mter describing a particularly gruesome kidnapping,
cannot be proven yet that he killed anybody. Because of his callous indiffer-
ence to human life, he deserves to die. Another candidate is Richard Reid,
"the shoe bomber," who, but for the last second intercession by alert passen-
gers and crew, would have blown a commercial jet full of people out of the
sky. He deserves to die, although he did not kill anyone. And a third, is a
guy named Betheley, in Louisiana, who raped three children, nine, seven
and five-one of them was his own-while he was HIV positive and knew it.
Whether or not the children live, he deserves to die.
Infra p. 178-79 (emphasis added). And how should they die? Blecker says it
should be "a quick and painful death." Robert Blecker, When the State Kills: Capi-
tal Punishment and the American Condition, by Austin Sarat, N.Y. L.J., May 11,
2001, at 2 (book review).
177. The expression is that of Professor Stephen Nathanson. NATHANSON,
supra note 14, at 140. This penetrating work has influenced me in diverse ways
throughout this writing.
178. Afiya Jordan, A State-By-State Look at Capital Punishment, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 16, 2002, at 7.
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rape, mutilation, and murder of an eleven year old girl179 by two
strangers, he states: "They are the 'worst of the worst.' They
deserve to die. I know that. I feel certain." 8 0
That seems to be the essence of Professor Blecker's argu-
ment, his feeling of certainty that the worst of the worst deserve
execution. If Blecker's certainty is evidence, then here is mine:
They don't deserve to die. I know that. I feel certain. The two
testimonials nullify one another, leaving the retributionist at
square one.
Conceptually, the Mosaic notion of "an eye for an eye; a
tooth for a tooth" (the so-called lex talionis), fails to provide a
workable theory of punishment for deviant behavior in general.
For example, the lex talionis cannot be coherently applied to the
peijurer, the arsonist, or the extortionist. It is not a theory of
punishment at all but a cliche, a catchy slogan, and thus gives
no aid to the retributionist. All that "an eye for an eye" soundly
reflects in the criminal law field is the idea of proportionality,
that society should punish murder more severely than it pun-
ishes shoplifting. It does not follow that the punishment for
murder need ever be set at death.
The wisdom of the death penalty is an old, old debate. Peo-
ple have strong views on the subject. It may be that at the end
of the day, nobody's opinions will change. Rational discourse,
however, may help to bring us closer together. As my contribu-
tion, I will discuss the more significant lessons that I have
learned about the death penalty.
First, an execution is not an act of self-defense. It permits
the killing of a person, even the worst of the worst, on a stan-
dard less than self-defense.18 1 The person strapped to a gurney
is then and there under our control, disarmed, and, therefore,
does not pose an imminent threat to the life or safety of the
executioner. Whatever the condemned may have done in the
179. Her name was Barbara Joe Brown. See Robert Blecker & Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Point/Counterpoint: To Live or Die?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 9, 2002 (Maga-
zine), at 10.
180. Supra p. 123.
181. Short of an "imminent" attack upon another, or a reasonable belief that
an "imminent" attack is taking place, there is no available claim of self-defense. 2
FRANcIs WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 189 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 15th
ed. 1993); 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery § 88 (2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (Mc-
Kinney 2003).
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past, no application of the justification provisions of our nation's
penal laws legitimates an execution under any self-defense the-
ory. The imposition of the death penalty is a gratuitous
killing.18 2
182. See Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, in 123 FIRST THINGS 17
(2002). In that statement, Justice Scalia adopts the view of St. Paul that individu-
als lack the right to take vengeance by putting wrongdoers to death. Id. at 19. He
concedes that capital punishment "is undoubtedly wrong unless one accords to the
state a scope of moral action that goes beyond what is permitted to the individual."
Id. at 18. He states that in his view, "the major impetus behind modern aversion
to the death penalty is the equation of private morality with government moral-
ity." Id. The problem that arises is that in a secular democratic nation like ours,
where the citizens themselves are said to lack individual moral authority to put
others to death and thus have no such power to delegate to their government, Jus-
tice Scalia's analysis lacks a source for the asserted government authority to per-
form executions. In an apparent effort to circumvent that problem and find that
source for the state's supposed "scope of moral action that goes beyond what is
permitted to the individual," id., Scalia is forced to deny the secular character of
our government and to resurrect rule by divine right. Here are his words:
The reaction of people of faith to this tendency . . .to obscure the divine
authority behind government should not be resignation to it, but the resolu-
tion to combat it as effectively as possible. We have done that in this coun-
try... by preserving in our public life many visible reminders that-in the
words of a Supreme Court opinion from the 1940s-"we are a religious peo-
ple, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." These reminders in-
clude: "In God we trust" on our coins, "one nation, under God" in our Pledge
of Allegiance, the opening of sessions of our legislatures with a prayer, the
opening of sessions of my Court with "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court," annual Thanksgiving proclamations issued by our Presi-
dent at the direction of Congress, and constant invocations of divine support
in the speeches of our political leaders, which often conclude, "God bless
America." All this, as I say.., helps explain why our people are more in-
clined to understand, as St. Paul did, that government carries the sword as
"the minister of God," to "execute wrath" upon the evildoer.
Scalia, supra, at 19-20. In light of Scalia's theological justification for the death
penalty in America, future research should explore whether capital punishment is
an establishment of religion or breaches the separation of church and state-con-
trary to the First Amendment. Cf. Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin'
on Heaven's Door: Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1090 (2001). Meanwhile, we are left with state terminations of life on
a standard less than self-defense. Is that the lesson that the government should be
teaching-that it is allowable to kill, even when there is no imminent risk to the
killer's life? As Justice Brandeis said in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), "Our government is the potent, the omnipres-
ent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example." Id. at
485.
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Second, an execution is a ritual killing,18 3 a rite. The cere-
mony at the "death house" is totally scripted and rehearsed,
pre-defined down to the last detail in the execution protocols184
of the jurisdictions which punish by death. That type of death,
a death by appointment, is no less a rite than those practiced in
the so-called primitive societies described by anthropologists
like Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, and others.
A further dimension of capital punishment relates to the
developmental consequences of the state's employment of some
of its citizens to be the executioners of other members of their
own community. People being paid to kill other people. In
states with high rates of execution, the state's executioners kill
frequently. What happens to workers who participate in per-
forming scheduled terminations of life?185 Can one be sum-
moned periodically to the death house to do that work without
suffering demoralization and brutalization? Does one risk
post-traumatic stress disorder 8 6 or something akin to it? How
183. See MARK COSTANZO, JUST REVENGE: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
DEATH PENALTY 53-58 (1997); Gene C. Toews, The Execution of Timothy McVeigh:
Ritual Sacrifice in America, at http://www.headlinemuse.com/askhermes/sacrifice.
htm (2001).
184. See, e.g., Committee on Criminal Justice-The Florida Senate, A Moni-
tor: Methods of Execution & Protocols, at http://www.fcc.state.fl.us/fccreports/mon-
itor/contmon.html (Sept. 1997).
185. According to Mark Costanzo, prison workers who have aided in carrying
out executions have been "deeply affected." COsTANzO, supra note 183, at 56. He
observes that, "Donald Cabana, a former prison warden, described an execution he
presided over as the most difficult experience of his life." Id. Costanzo notes, quot-
ing Cabana: "I watched the terrible pain of guards who had worked for eight years
with this young man and who would turn their face from you, not in shame, but
because they didn't want you to see the emotions and the pain and the burden on
them." Id. (citation omitted).
186. See comments by Fred Allen who participated in 130 executions at the
Walls Unit in Huntsville, Texas.
I was just working in the shop and all of a sudden something just triggered
in me and I started shaking. And then I walked back into the house and my
wife asked "What's the matter?" and I said "I don't feel good." And tears-
uncontrollable tears-was coming out of my eyes. And she said "What's the
matter?" And I said "I just thought about that execution that I did two days
ago, and everybody else's that I was involved with." And what it was was
something triggered within and it just-everybody-all of these executions
all of a sudden all sprung forward .... Just like taking slides in a film
projector and having a button and just pushing a button and just watching,
over and over: him, him, him. I don't know if it's mental breakdown, I don't
know if... probably would be classified more as a traumatic stress, similar
to what individuals in war had. You know, they'd come back from war, it
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does one define one's existence? How does one list one's occupa-
tion on a tax return? How does one present oneself to one's
neighbors? Or one's children? Are we not morally responsible
for the impact we have on other human beings? Those desig-
nated to kill for the state have suffered very destructive
effects.187
A fourth aspect of the death penalty involves its contraven-
tion of a basic tenet of our national culture: "You don't kick
someone when they are down." Regardless of the perpetrator's
past behavior, to kill that person when he or she is subdued,
strapped to a gurney, already down and helpless, is a denial of
fair play. Because capital punishment violates this venerable
might be three months, it might be two years, it might be five years, all of a
sudden they relive it again, and all that has to come out. You see I can
barely even talk because I'm thinking more and more of it. You know, there
was just so many of 'em.
All Things Considered: Witness to an Execution (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 20,
2000), available at http://www.soundportraits.orgon-air/witness-to an execution/
transcript.php3 (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
187. See id. Research by Michael Osofsky, an undergraduate psychology stu-
dent at Stanford University, concerning the impact upon prison workers who as-
sisted in executions was done at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. It
was discovered that some participants would "break down," suffered "considerable
anxiety," or experienced "guilt" worrying about their salvation. Meredith Alexan-
der, "Inside the Mind of an Execution Team" Sophomore's Research Examines the
Emotions of Individuals Who Interact with Death Row Inmates, STAN. REP., May 8,
2001 (citing Michael Osofsky, Along the Death Trail: Inside the Mind of an
Execution Team (May 6, 2001) (unpublished paper presented at the 154th Annual
Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association) (on file with the author)), availa-
ble at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2001/may9/osofsky-59.html. One staff
member "never sleeps on the night after an execution and wonders how society will
judge him and his coworkers in 500 years." Ken Hausman, Researcher Enters
Minds of Death-Row Officers, 36 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 6 (2001) (citing Osofsky,
supra), available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgicontent/full36/12/6. Osof-
sky observed that the "majority of officers seem to suppress their feelings and do
not have any cathartic outlets for talk. Instead .. .members of the death team
generally do not talk about the prison, and especially the execution process once
returning home, putting on their 'tough guy' facade." Osofsky, supra. Osofsky dis-
covered "an unusually high incidence of divorce among the execution team. While
the national average rate of divorce is around fifty percent, nearly three-fourths of
this group of officers had been divorced at least one time." Id.; Hausman, supra;
Alexander, supra. The write up of Osofsky's research contains a very graphic ac-
count of the execution process and its effects upon those who carry it out. It cites
earlier studies of the subject. See Osofsky, supra.
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cultural precept, l88 it is un-American. Executions corrode our
tradition.
Fifth, death as punishment, is unsupported by the stated
objectives of American criminal law. These objectives, as set
forth in the public policy purpose clauses 8 9 of our nation's crim-
inal codes, include deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacita-
tion, but contain no explicit' 90 legitimation of vengeance, the
cornerstone1 9' of the retributionist position.1 92
188. This aspect of American national character has been applied in a wide
variety of contexts as reflected in the output of the search engines "Google" and
"Yahoo!" using the search terms "You don't kick someone when they are down;"
"when they're down;" "when he's down;" and "You don't kick 'em when they're
down."
189. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-3 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.100 (Michie 2003);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-101 et seq. (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12 (West
2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6502
(2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.012 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-2 (2003);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 701-103 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 18-106 (Michie 2003); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-2 (West 2003); IND. CODE §§ 11-8-4-1, -8-4-8, -12-1-2 (2003);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4601 (2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.304 (Banks-Baldwin
2003); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.1 (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 1151 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 6-202 (2003); MD. CODE
ANN. CORR. SERV. § 3-502 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 364.01 (2003); MIss. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-5-3, -5-10 (2003); Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.015 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-
103 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-102 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 169.035, 179A.020
(2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651:61-a, 621:2 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2
(West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-21-4, 33-1-6, 33-8-3 (Michie 2003); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 1.05 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 148-22, -22.1 (2003); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.11 (West 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1514 (West 2003);
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.025 (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 104 (West 2003); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-1-2 (Michie
2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-101 (2003); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02 (Vernon
2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-104 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7030, tit. 28, § 1
(2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-67.8 (Michie 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.04.020 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-1-1a (Michie 2003); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 938.01 (West 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-106 (Michie 2003).
190. In the case of one non-death penalty state, Rhode Island, its purpose
clause includes the phrase "the retributive goal of sentencing." R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-19-23.1(3) (2003). Six other jurisdictions speak of "just and deserved punish-
ment," the "sentence he deserves," "merited punishment," "just punishment," (two
jurisdictions) and "fair punishment," respectively. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 13-101
(Michie 2003); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1-102.5 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-02
(2003); 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 1A1.1 (2004) (federal sentencing guidelines); D.C. CODE.
ANN. § 24-112 (2003); 33 P.R. LAws ANN. § 3284 (2003). As to three other states,
Iowa, Massachusetts, and Michigan, all non-death penalty jurisdictions, research
has failed to disclose purpose clauses in their criminal codes.
191. Justice Antonin Scalia has spoken of "the authority of a government to
exact vengeance..." and that "just retribution is a legitimate purpose (indeed, the
principal legitimate purpose)" of the death penalty. Scalia, supra note 182, at 19-
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20. The retributionist, Walter Berns, confirms the role of revenge in capital pun-
ishment. See WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY
OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1991). In Berns' words: "anger is accompanied not only by
the pain caused by him who is the object of anger, but by the pleasure arising from
the expectation of exacting revenge on someone who is thought to deserve it." Id.
at 153 (citations omitted). And later: "Shakespeare shows us vengeful men be-
cause there is something in the souls of men-men then and men now-that re-
quires such crimes to be revenged." Id. at 168. Professor Blecker appears to
display vengeful feelings, when, advocating a "quick and painful death," he speaks
of his willingness to attend Timothy McVeigh's execution: "I would.., hate him as
he takes his last breath and feel satisfaction that he is being put to death justly, if
too gently." Blecker, supra note 176. Elsewhere, Blecker quotes Professor Herbert
L. Packer: "The retributive view rests on the idea that it is right for the wicked to
be punished: because man is responsible for his actions, he ought to receive his just
deserts. The view can take either of two main versions: the revenge theory or the
expiation theory." Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison:
Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1167 n.35 (1990) (cita-
tion omitted) [hereinafter Haven or Hell?]. See generally SuSAN JACOBY, WILD JUS-
TICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE (1983).
192. A principal reason given in support of the death penalty is the avoidance
of mob rule, vigilantism, and lynching. According to Professor Blecker, "Justice
Holmes, who found retribution morally repulsive, believed it socially necessary to
gratify our feelings of vengeance. Only a prospect of official retribution after due
process of law restrains an angry mob, sometimes a majority mob." Haven or
Hell?, supra note 191, at 1167; see NORMAN DORSEN & LEON FRIEDMAN, DISORDER
IN COURT: REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COURTROOM CONDUCT 13-15 (1973). Indeed, the connection
between lynching and capital punishment seems to be a very close one. According
to Franklin E. Zimring: "modern executions are concentrated in those sections of
the United States where the hangman used to administer popular justice without
legal sanction .... [Tihe propensity to execute in the twenty-first century is a
direct legacy of a history of lynching...." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADIC-
TIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 89 (2003). Pam McAllister has noted
that: "[wi]hen lynching subsided in the 1930s, the number of legal executions rose."
PAM McALLISTER, DEATH DEFYING: DISMANTLING THE EXECUTION MACHINERY IN
21ST CENTURY U.S.A. 20 (2003). The Supreme Court put forth the prevention of
lynching as its justification for capital punishment. Speaking for the Court, Jus-
tice Potter Stewart wrote:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that
instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important pur-
pose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people
begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the
seeds of anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972)). In my view, this rationale for the
death penalty is seriously flawed:
We, in the due process tradition, condemn mob-dominated trials like that of
Leo Frank, where the cries for the defendant's blood by the throngs outside
the courthouse were heard and felt by the jurors. If Justice Stewart [is]
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A sixth aspect of capital punishment concerns the large
number of inhabitants of our nation's death rows who are
psychotic, neurologically or developmentally damaged, and oth-
erwise mentally ill or impaired. 193 We are executing many seri-
ously deranged and defective people. 194 For example, when one
correct that to avoid vigilantism the law must do in the courtroom what the
larger society outside insists on and would do for itself if the law failed to do
it on it's [sic] behalf, then have we not succumbed to vigilantism right inside
the courtroom? Public justice is not private justice. Is it not intolerable for
the ministers of the law to ask the larger society concerning the accused, "Do
you want a piece of him"? Would the judicial robe or all the pomp, dignity
and wood paneling in the world mask the ... bottom-line meaning, "We
have ordered that the condemned be put to death, for if we don't, the mob
outside will"?
William M. Erlbaum, Editorial, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, at 2.
193. According to Professor Kirchmeier, the condemned "are severely dam-
aged human beings... 'the sickest of the sick' in that they are people with mental
illnesses and brain damage, and they are people who suffered horrible brutality as
children." Blecker & Kirchmeier, supra note 179, at 11. To the same effect, see
ELLIOrr CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE 181-221 (1985).
There are a "large number of seriously mentally ill inmates" in our prisons. Abra-
ham L. Halpern, M.D. & Alfred M. Freedman, M.D., Editorial, N.Y. REV., Dec. 4,
2003, at 62. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OF-
FENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2003), available at http://hrw.orgreports/2003/
usal003/usal003.pdf; Fox Butterfield, Study Finds Hundreds of Thousands of In-
mates Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at A14; Paul Von Zielbauer, Report
Says Many Inmates in Isolation are Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at B1;
Correctional Association Report, Prison Mental Health Project, at http://www.cor-
rectionalassociation.org/PMHP/description.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2003); BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ 188215, SPECIAL
REPORT, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS (2001), available at www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtspOO.pdf.
194. LEWIS, supra note 115; Sally Satel, M.D., It's Crazy to Execute the Insane,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at A18. Illustrative, is the case of Rickey Ray Rector,
[T]he mentally impaired death row inmate in Arkansas who became famous
when Governor Bill Clinton flew home from the campaign trail in 1992 to
oversee his execution .... Taken from his cell for his death walk, the pris-
oner asked guards to save the piece of pecan pie left on his tray for when he
returned. A few minutes later, on the hospital gurney in the death chamber,
he helped the executioners find a vein for the IV because, as Christopher
Hitchens observed, "he thought they were doctors come at last to cure him."
ROBERT JAY LIFrON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF EXECUTIONS 100-01 (2000). Psychiat-
ric impairment also appears in cases involving "moral monsters" like Timothy Mc-
Veigh, the Oklahoma bomber. See William M. Erlbaum, American Terrorist:
Timothy McVeigh & the Oklahoma City Bombing, by Lou Michel & Dan Herbeck,
N.Y. L.J., June 8, 2001, at 2 (book review). See also RON ROSENBAUM, EXPLAINING
HITLER: THE SEARCH FOR THE ORIGINS OF HIS EVIL (1998). It should not go unno-
ticed that the elimination of defectives was one of the hallmarks of Nazi Germany.
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considers the pathology and violence in the lives of murderers,
it is paradoxical how docilely they cooperate in their own elabo-
rate execution ceremonies. Talk about "death with dignity!"
They go so quietly.195 It is very rare for even violent criminals
to resist. Is this because it would be futile? It seems more
likely that after years shut away in the house of death, the con-
demned criminal is half dead already. 196
A further lesson of the death penalty in America is that it
wastes billions of tax dollars. Executions are many times more
expensive to produce than any other existing form of punish-
ment.197 In contrast, it costs pennies a day to feed or vaccinate
See INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 120-28
(1991).
195. "In his moving book Death Work, Robert Johnson notes that very few
condemned prisoners have to be forcibly dragged to the execution chamber." Co-
STANZO, supra note 183, at 55. Michael Osofsky makes the same observation:
"[e]ven the members of the strapdown team are awed by how the inmates are able
to do it. Many admitted that in a similar position, they would have to be carried to
their death." Osofsky, supra note 187.
196. Professor Costanzo observes:
A psychiatrist who worked with the condemned concluded that confinement
on death row "invariably results in claustrophobia, and often results in
chronic anxiety and depression. Prisoners . . .eventually lose the will to
live. The prolonged confinement in a small cell with a light kept burning by
night could be regarded as a form of psychological torture." If torture, as
defined by the United Nations, consists of "severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental," then waiting for several years on death row for an ap-
pointment with the executioner surely qualifies as psychological torture.
According to the testimonies of torture survivors around the world, "The
threat of execution is one of the most terrifying forms of torture . . . ." In-
deed, many condemned prisoners become so despondent that they decide to
abandon further appeals and ask the state to carry out the execution. They
submit to a sort of state-sponsored suicide. Death starts to seem like the
only way to escape their miserable existence.
Condemned men have already been tamed and exhausted by years of con-
finement. Something resembling emotional death has already been accom-
plished and all that remains is to kill the body.
COSTANzo, supra note 183, at 52-53, 55 (citations omitted). See Greene supra note
44.
197. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 401-10 (Hugo
Adam Bedau ed., 1997); ACLU Report, The High Costs of the Death Penalty, at
http://www.moratoriumcampaign.org/facts/highcost.DOC (last visited Apr. 2,
2004); Daniel Wise, Capital Punishment Proves to be Expensive. Costs are Tough
to Pin Down, but Defense Attorney's Fees Alone Exceed $68 Million, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
30, 2002, at 1; Fox Butterfield, Study Finds Steady Increase at All Levels of Gov-
ernment In Cost of Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at A14.
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a child and save a life. 198 By maintaining the death penalty, we
forego the opportunity to save millions of innocent children and
their families from malnutrition, disease, and untimely death.
Eighth, capital prosecutions seriously damage our nation's
courts and harm the communities that need and depend on
those courts. Because capital prosecutions are so labor inten-
sive, the death penalty has become the great "black hole" in our
court systems, siphoning off a disproportionately large volume
of their adjudicative capacity. 199 The non-capital cases of the
judge presiding over a capital case may be put on hold for
weeks, if not months, forcing other litigants to "cool their heels"
until the judge finds time to deal with their cases. Capital cases
generate a staggering number of written pre-trial motions.
Capital jury selection alone often requires that hundreds of pro-
spective jurors be summoned to the courthouse and questioned,
a procedure that can itself take weeks to complete. Meanwhile,
the diminished pool of available jurors results in other court-
rooms being unable to get the jurors they need. Court officers
and court reporters are diverted to capital courtrooms, deplet-
ing other court parts of needed staff. While the hoopla, hyste-
ria,200 and media tumult 20 1 of a capital case is occurring, judges
198. See, e.g., World Health Organization, Unfinished business: Global Push
to Save 11 Million Children, at http://www.who.int/inf/en/pr-2002-18.html (Mar.
12, 2002); Society For Biomaterials, Ten Dollars That Could Save a Life, at http://
web.archive.org/web/20030124233608/http://biomaterials.org/pubs/v23i6/ten.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2004); UNICEF, Make a Promise, Save a Life, at http://
web.archive.org/web/20011217110521/http://www.unicefusa.org/pledge.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2004).
199. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. MURPHY, ET AL., MANAGING NOTORIOUS TRIALS
(1998). The strain upon the courts was dramatically illustrated recently when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit failed to timely pass upon an
application for a stay of execution in a death case affecting three Texas inmates
who were scheduled to be executed that night, leaving the prison authorities un-
certain as to whether to proceed with the executions. According to a published
report, "for the first time anyone could remember, a federal appeals court had es-
sentially thrown up its hands, declining to decide on deadline whether to let Mr.
Vickers die by lethal injection or stay his execution." Ralph Blumenthal, 3 In-
mates' Lives Spared In Texas by Court Inaction, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2003, at All.
200. Perhaps the most extreme modem example of this phenomenon, one of
countless others before and after, was the trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann. On
appeal, the court referred blandly to the "great popular excitement" and the'crowded courtroom at all stages of the case." State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809,
813 (N.J. 1935). Some years later, another court, more aptly described the
Hauptmann trial atmosphere as "primitive and disgusting." Maurice River Town-
2003]
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in other courtrooms are presiding over court calendars of 150 to
200 domestic violence and other difficult and sensitive cases
each day leaving them scarcely two or three minutes to handle
each case. Nor is the harm caused by capital cases limited to
trial courts; appellate courts, too, labor under the severe bur-
dens of capital appeals, proceedings that involve the need to
read and study massive court transcripts, lengthy preparation
for oral argument, and huge investment of judicial manpower,
all of which cause bad skewing of the operations of those
courts.202
A final aspect of the death penalty that I would like to dis-
cuss concerns the posture that supporters of execution take to-
ward murder victims' surviving family members and friends,
whom I call the secondary victims. Retributionists such as At-
torney General John Ashcroft have offered these secondary vic-
tims the promise that they will find "closure" through the
execution of the murderer.2 3 Instead of offering them anything
ship Bd. of Educ. v. Maurice River Township Teachers Ass'n, 455 A.2d 563, 564
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982).
201. An extreme case, one of many, is Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966).
202. One case in point is the Florida Supreme Court which was severely af-
fected by the staggering burden of reviewing death cases. See generally VON
DREHLE, supra note 42. The New York Court of Appeals has suffered a similar
impact. With trial records each many thousands of pages, and briefs each hun-
dreds of pages, the court and each of its judges have had to hire additional staff.
Capital case review has been described as possibly "the greatest challenge facing
the Court .... Roy L. Reardon & Mary Elizabeth McGarry, New York Court of
Appeals Roundup, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 2001, at 3.
203. Defending the anticipated execution of Timothy McVeigh, Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft said: "My time with these brave survivors changed me. What
was taken from them can never be replaced nor fully restored. Their lives were
shattered. And I hope that we can help them meet their need to close this chapter
in their lives." John Ashcroft, Witness to an Execution, Online NewsHour, at http:/
/www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june0l/mcveigh-5-12.html (Apr. 12, 2001). On
that same television broadcast, Bonnie Bucqueroux, Executive Director of Crime
Victims for a Just Society, said:
[Tihere is this assumption that victims are monolithically in support what
have [sic] is happening to Tim McVeigh. I would point out that in the crime
victims group that I work with, one of our board members is Bud Welch
whose daughter was a victim of the blast. And, yet, he is an active opponent
of the death penalty. And I'm sure that [the day of the execution] will be a
very troubling day for him.
[W]ouldn't you agree... that victims and victim families are being manipu-
lated by politicians who are really trying to use them for their own pur-
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substantive, such as free counseling or college scholarship
money for their children or funds to pay off a mortgage, they are
offered the illusory comfort of retribution. Money wasted to
mount extravagant capital prosecutions could better be spent
doing something real for those victims. Instead, politicians find
funds to support executions, exploit homicides to promote their
careers, and turn different segments of the community against
one another, all the while not doing a blessed thing for the sur-
vivors. This rabble-rousing does not necessarily mean that
those politicians actually believe in the death penalty. It may
simply be a tactical ploy to garner votes.2 04 There is also the
related phenomenon of elected judges in death penalty states
leaning heavily toward executions in order to be reelected to the
bench 20 5 because they want to appear "tough on crime." Is this
not careerism at the expense of the lives of others?
Secondary victims do not speak with one voice. Follow-up
studies have shown that many do not seek to find closure
through execution and do not seek to kill for comfort. Many ul-
timately strive to understand the murderer, to reconcile, and to
poses? I think in this case McVeigh has been made a poster child to try to
gin up support for the death penalty, which is clearly waning in the culture.
Bonnie Bucqueroux, Witness to an Execution, Online NewsHour, at http://www.
pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june0l/mcveigh-5-12.html (Apr. 12, 2001). See Mark
Hamblett, Ashcroft Memo Discourages Plea Bargains, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 23, 2003, at
1; William Glaberson, Judge Denounces Attorney General's Death-Penalty Push,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at B3.
204. As Alan Berlow has observed:
For most members of Congress, ensuring fairness in the death penalty pro-
cess is less urgent than demonstrating that they're "tough on crime." How
else to explain Congress's decision to defund postconviction defender organi-
zations that once provided a useful mechanism to check legally flawed death
sentences? Or Congress's passage, one year after the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing, of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which deci-
mated habeas corpus review not just for death row inmates but for everyone
else as well?
Alan Berlow, The Broken Machinery of Death, in THE LANAHAN READINGS IN CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 240 (David M. O'Brien ed., 2d ed. 2003); see Stephen
B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on Crime," but
Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 479 (1995).
205. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 33; Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges
and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent
Federal Judges is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1806 (2000). Compare Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Ward v. Vill. of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
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find closure through forgiveness. 2 6 After "liberty" and "equal-
ity," the third concept in the motto of the French Revolution is
"fraternity." It is the cornerstone of the so-called "third genera-
tion" of international human rights, the right to human solidar-
ity.207 That ideal is embraced in Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: "All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood."20 8 Act in a spirit of brotherhood. A brother or sis-
ter in the human family may wrong another, even grievously,
206. In contrast to victim groups seeking closure through execution, consider
such groups as Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation (http:/!
mvfr.siteinhouse.comindex.jsp), the American Friends Service Committee's Relig-
ious Organizing Against the Death Penalty Project (http://www.deathpenaltyre-
ligious.org), the Living Theatre's "Not In My Name" (http://www.livingtheatre.org
nimn/), Crime Victims for a Just Society (http://www.crimevictims.net/), and Fel-
lowship of Reconciliation (http://www.forusa.org/). Some groups and individuals
aspire to pursue truth and reconciliation and forgiveness as their path to closure.
Consider, for example, Robert Rule, whose sixteen-year old daughter, Linda, was
one of forty-eight victims murdered by serial killer Gary L. Ridgway, the "Green
River killer." At his sentencing, a number of the secondary victims expressed their
hatred of him. According to a press report:
Mr. Ridgway ... appeared largely unaffected by their words until Robert
Rule, a sometime Santa Claus impersonator with a long white beard and
rainbow suspenders, approached the microphone .... As Mr. Rule spoke,
Mr. Ridgway wiped away tears. "Mr. Ridgway, there are people here that
hate you," Mr. Rule said. "I'm not one of them. I forgive you for what you
have done."
Matthew Preusch, Families Speak as Green River Killer Gets 48 Life Terms, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at A24. See Susan Sachs, Q&A: Punishing a Terrorist by
Showing Him His Victim's Humanity, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2002, at B9.
207. See RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 179 (2d ed. 1991).
208. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). For the fascinating history of the creation of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNWER-
SAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT (1999). From
its inception, our Constitution has embraced the "Law of Nations." See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. As the Supreme Court observed in Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900), "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as ques-
tions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Id. at
700. Moreover, every treaty to which our nation is a party is "the supreme law of
the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI. See LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States),
2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/wldcourt/icj/
2001/german.htm. There is also a growing accountability for violations of interna-
tional human rights law, one that embraces even heads of state and other govern-
ment officials. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Regina v.
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY
yet the wrongdoer is still part of the family-never a stranger.
It is actually a desecration of our humanity to put our brethren
to death.20 9
Norman L. Greene
I have to think about that one for a while. David Von
Drehle is the one on this panel who has had most of the experi-
ence with death row. Who is down there, what are these people
like, and what are their lives like? Please come up here and tell
us about them.
David Von Drehle
I hadn't planned to do that. I'd be happy to. Although I feel
a little like I should just sit down and let Bill and Robert go at
it. This sounds like it could be juicy. You know, one of the
things that struck me listening, having had the opportunity to
listen to all of the panelists, is that I've been attending and par-
ticipating in panels like this for about a dozen to fifteen or so
years, and the quality of information is so much higher than it
once was. It's absolutely astonishing. We talked about many of
these issues twelve to fifteen years ago, but really did not know
what we were talking about. Professor Fagan's study,210 for ex-
ample, has put actual numbers on things that we've groped
around with for years, and, beyond that, I was struck by the fact
that Robert Blecker, I found, for the first time is really a propo-
nent of the death penalty who has generally engaged the reality
of the system as it exists today. He understands it. He under-
stands the issues with it and this is very heartening, because I
am often asked by journalists working on studies: "who can I
talk to who is in favor of the death penalty?" Most people, who
like the idea, because they are in the dominant public policy
positions, don't have much incentive to spend a lot of time stud-
ying it. And so I have a hard time recommending people who
are knowledgeable proponents, and I will no longer be in that
Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pi-
nochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999).
209. Much appreciation is expressed to Elise Rucker for extensive research
assistance, Carol Crawford for editorial help, Crystal Roberson for secretarial sup-
port, and friends and colleagues for numerous helpful discussions.
210. See Columbia Study II, supra note 40; see also Columbia Study, supra
note 139.
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situation. Finally, I was struck in hearing, from Judge
Erlbaum, the classic, old-fashioned tub-thumping moral case
against which, again because we have so much more informa-
tion and we now talk at a rarified level of the systemic problems
that Jeffrey laid out so brilliantly, we don't get to hear it as
much as we used to, and it's nice to hear it from time to time. I
probably revealed myself now as being just as morally ambiva-
lent as Robert Blecker accused me of being.211 I'm not morally
ambivalent; I agree with him that there are the "worst of the
worst." I agree with him that they deserve to die. I'm not sure
where that takes us in terms of the public policy position, how-
ever, because I've always felt as Shakespeare has said in Ham-
let, let's say, that if we all got what we deserved, few of us would
escape a whipping.212 So, obviously, none of us here deserve to
be born in the richest country in the world, at the best time in
history to be alive. I know for a fact that the children dying in
Malawi didn't deserve to be born there or starve to death in
childhood. 213 What Robert Blecker has put his finger on, and
that I think is most valuable, is the fact that a narrowing of the
current death penalty undertaking is necessary if it's going to
continue as a valuable public policy. Let me tell you, quoting
from myself, about the failure, thus far, to identify and execute
the "worst of the worst." I covered the execution of Ted
Bundy214 and he certainly met my standard of the "worst of the
worst." But at the time I finished this book, that so many peo-
ple have been so nice about, this was the condition of things in
the State of Florida. The State had just executed its twentieth
inmate, in the modern system, who was a brain damaged, and
abused child.215 But at the same time:
[Mien like Gerald Stano survived. Stano confessed to killing more
than two dozen women. As of this writing, Gerald Stano is still
alive. Thomas Knight, who murdered a prison guard while await-
ing execution for two other murders, is still alive-twenty years
[now 30 years] after his first death sentence. Jesus Scull, who
211. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
212. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DEN-
MARK act 2, sc. 2.
213. See Peter Goodspeed, Famine Stalking Southern Africa: Millions of Peo-
ple in Six Countries Face Threat of Starvation, NAT'L POST, May 7, 2002, at A13.
214. VoN DREHLE, supra note 42, at 385-400.
215. Id. at 407-08.
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robbed and murdered two victims and burned their house around
them, is alive. Howard Douglas, who forced his wife to have sex
with her boyfriend as he watched, then smashed the man's head
in, is alive. Robert Buford, who raped and beat a seven-year-old
girl to death, is alive. Eddie Lee Freeman, who strangled a for-
mer nun and dumped her in a river to drown, is alive. Jesse Hall,
who raped and murdered Susan Routt and killed her boyfriend on
Dunedin Beach, is alive. Derreck Manning, who shot two depu-
ties to death as they tried to arrest him for rape, is alive.216
And so on.
The system that the State of Florida had at that point was
clearly failing to execute the "worst of the worst." And the rea-
son it was failing, I believe, is that the death penalty that we
have come to live with in the United States is rested fundamen-
tally on questions of feeling in deference to Professor Blecker
and, if it doesn't sound too bad, I might say questions of taste.
In other words, the personal attitudes and preferences that I
have found in the course of interviewing over 100 people inti-
mately involved with the system, vary enormously, whether
they support the death penalty or oppose it. One judge can
think the worst possible case is X and the next judge will say,"no, that's not the worst, the worst is something else." And that
the long running, now thirty year, attempt to identify and sepa-
rate those out has not brought us any closer to the solution. I
wrote about a lawyer, unfortunately dead now, named Craig
Barnard, who was a great anti-death penalty lawyer and
scholar in Florida.217 And in 1989 he decided to take a look at
capital cases in Florida, and how they were being applied. 218 I
think this is still relevant to the question of personal feelings
and of taste. And this is what he found.
Barnard looked at the way the Court treated one of the sim-
plest aggravating factors in the Florida statutes called "previ-
ous conviction for a capital or violent felony."219 Now that
sounds like a clear-cut, straightforward, factual definition. And
he noted that the Florida Supreme Court could not agree on the
meaning of the word "previous." That at one point they had
216. Id. at 408.
217. Id. at 177-81.
218. Id. at 402.
219. VON DREHLE, supra note 42, at 402.
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ruled that contemporaneous acts of violence on a single victim
could count as previous. In other words, in a rape murder case,
if the person is convicted of the rape and the murder, the rape
could be a previous capital offense for the murder. But, three
years later they reversed themselves and said, "no, it had to be
separate crimes." 220 I haven't looked back to see if they changed
back yet. It wouldn't surprise me. He looked at a great risk of
death to many persons, which is another classic aggravator. "In
1980, the court had declared that a fire set to cover up a murder
constituted a 'great risk' to 'many persons' because the fire may
have spread to neighboring homes."221 A reasonable decision.
But in 1987, reconsidering the very same case they found that
that was not the case.222
More esoteric, if you will, aggravators are even more diffi-
cult. The classic being that the murder is "cold, calculated, and
premeditated... without any pretense of moral or legal justifi-
cation."223 I suspect that that would come close to a classic ag-
gravator in Professor Blecker's world:
In the cases he had examined, Barnard had found the court abso-
lutely flummoxed by its meaning. The justice had decided that
the factor[s cold, calculated and premeditated] applied to one
James Card, who robbed a store, abducted the clerk, drove eight
miles to an secluded spot, and cut her throat.224
Robert Preston's case then came before them and the facts were
these. "He also robbed a store, abducted the clerk, drove her to
a remote spot, and cut her throat."225 In that case, the same
court the same identical seven justices found the aggravator did
not apply:
The justices accepted the "cold, calculated" factor in the case of a
man who shot his victim nine times, because they felt he could
have reconsidered while reloading. But they rejected the factor in
a case where the killer stabbed the robbery victim one hundred
and ten times time. (Eventually, the Florida Supreme Court
[wisely, well wisely now, I didn't write it in the book,] threw up its
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 403 (quotations omitted).
224. VON DREHLE, supra note 42, at 403.
225. Id. at 374.
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hands and struck "cold, calculated" from the books, saying it was
too vague to be lawful). 226
And it wasn't just the Florida Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court had these same problems. For fourteen
years and more than twenty executions it found that Florida's
aggravating circumstance-the one Jeffrey mentioned ear-
lier 227-"heinous, atrocious, or cruel"228 was absolutely constitu-
tional, 229 and after twenty executions and fourteen years they
rejected it as unconstitutionally vague.230 In other words, the
effort to choose the "worst of the worst" has been going on, has
been mandated in fact, by the United States Supreme Court
since 1976,231 and it has failed. Now it occurs to me that it is
theoretically possible that the system could work if questions of
personal feeling and, if you will taste, about these crimes could
be defined out of the system and aggravators became clearly
and unquestionably simple matters of fact. I think that I've
showed how difficult this could be in some of the examples
given. But a classic death penalty case has always been consid-
ered to be treason against your country in wartime. That might
possibly be such a case if you prove treason and you prove
there's a declaration of war on at the time, you would have
proved the aggravators. Conceivably, mass murder you'd have
to set the number from mass, conceivably genocide. I have a
harder time with Adolph Hitler than Judge Erlbaum does. 232
Serial killing conceivably, if you could define serial in such a
way that it was not covering someone who went from office to
office in a single episode, perhaps. Another classic, killing a law
enforcement officer in the line of duty. That's a classic death
penalty case. And that seems largely factual to me. And fi-
nally, classic death penalty case, killing while under sentence of
life without parole. In other words, a case in which there is
nothing more we can do to you, under the current system, you
already have the maximum punishment and you're serving it,
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
228. See FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141(5)(h) (1996).
229. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 424 (1976).
230. VON DREHLE, supra note 42, at 403 (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393 (1987)).
231. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. 424.
232. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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and you go and kill somebody, what do you do then. Unfortu-
nately, or fortunately, or however you view this issue, I think an
issue would remain and that's how I read the jurisprudence of
the United States Supreme Court,233 mandatory death penal-
ties, even for these crimes would be unconstitutional and all of
these would continue to require hearings of mitigation after the
sentencing. And I think Professor Fagan could speak better
than I to the near inevitability of lengthy appellate argument
over the findings of what are ultimately, hugely subjective find-
ings of mitigation. So what then if I am morally in fact ambiva-
lent, which I'm uncomfortable with, having been a moral
philosophy major in college and writing my paper on Kant, who
is not really considered much of a waffler but, if I am morally
ambivalent, I guess that I would ask this question: Which is the
higher value, at this point for the United States, is it to attempt
to issue a punishment that, I would agree, is absolutely de-
served, but that the delivery of which punishment has proven
over many, many years and in every jurisdiction to leave the
justice system tied up in knots, contradicting itself and ulti-
mately failing to deliver the punishments it claims to be meting
out? Professor Blecker mentioned that there are 3,500 people
on death row today.234 Fewer than 100 of them will be executed
this year.235 That's a one in thirty-five chance. A total of 885
people have been executed in the United States since the death
penalty was reinstated in 1976.236 That's out of, how many
sentences would you estimate, 7,500, something like that,
6,500. So that's, less than 12%. The chances are that a death
penalty meted out in the United States by a court, will never be
carried out, and I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Fagan
that this is a severely, corrosive state of affairs for our justice
system. 237 Is it worth it to us, to pursue this rarified, philosoph-
ical idea of desert, at the cost of disfiguring the system of justice
otherwise, I came to the conclusion it's not. But I am very
pleased to be a part of a very provocative discussion of this issue
233. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
234. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
235. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, KEY
FACTS AT A GLANCE: EXECUTIONS (2004), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/ta-
bles/exetab.htm.
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24:107170
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY
and a better one than I've seen or heard in many years. Thank
you very much.
Norman L. Greene
Robert Blecker for his rebuttal. However, I am not sure
that he needs a rebuttal, because I think that he received a good
deal of support tonight.
Robert Blecker
First, Jeffrey Kirchmeier, as to "heinous, atrocious, or
cruel,"238 the proper designation is "especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel." Let's not forget what cruelty is. Oxford English
Dictionary defines "cruel" as follows: "[o]f persons... [disposed
to inflict suffering; indifferent to or taking pleasure in another's
pain or distress ... [o]f actions,... [piroceeding from or showing
indifference to or pleasure in another's distress."239 That's the
essence of cruelty, taking pleasure in or being indifferent to an-
other's pain. The attitude that we condemn is at the extreme
and ONLY at the extreme-"especially heinous, atrocious and
cruel."
Jeffrey Kirchmeier's other mistake, in my view, is to equate
arbitrariness with discretion. There is inevitably discretion. In
an individual case, this forces us outside specific predictability.
"Law can never issue an injunction binding on all which really
embodies what is best for each: it cannot prescribe with perfect
accuracy what is good and right.. . " Plato observed. It hasn't
changed. That's the essence of law. Aristotle talks about eq-
uity, which is the "rectification of law in so far as the universal-
ity of law makes it deficient."240 Law can never determine all
things precisely in advance. According to Aristotle, "on some
matters legislation is impossible, and so a decree is needed. For
the standard applied to what is indefinite is itself indefinite...
,"241 Ultimately, the death penalty is not arbitrary, but
indefinite.
238. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
239. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 78 (2d ed. 1989) (definition la, c).
240. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, reprinted in CLASSICS OF MORAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY 315 (Michael L. Morgan ed., 2d ed. 1996).
241. Id.
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Jeffrey Fagan's study242 is very serious and important, but
it has its methodological critics. 243 Mainly, as Ron Eisenberg,
Deputy District Attorney of Philadelphia, points out, the odd
fact is that death penalty cases are being reversed much more
frequently than are non-death penalty murder cases, although
they are presented by the same prosecutors, defended by the
same defense attorneys and before the same judges. 244 Why is
that? Why should error be much more common in death penalty
cases? You think they're not being taken seriously? The much
higher reversal rate of capital penalties reveals a persistent
anti-death penalty bias of judges. The essential flaw in what
Professor Fagan said was "we studied error"245-as if error is
real whenever a death penalty is reversed. Error and being re-
versed are not one and the same thing. He was candid, and I
congratulate and admire him for observing that Judge Rakoff,
who just declared the whole federal death penalty unconstitu-
tional on the basis of the Columbia Study,246 which was not
drawn at all from the federal death penalty context, is a typical,
abolitionist judge who has a whole judicial history behind him.
It goes all the way back to the Sanhedrin, the ancient abolition-
ist Hebrew high court, which artfully conceived proceduralist
tricks to avoid the obvious command of the Old Testament that
242. See Columbia Study, supra note 139; Columbia Study II, supra note 40.
243. See, e.g., Press Release, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Death Pen-
alty Study Called Biased, Dishonest (Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://www.cjlf.org/
releases/02-01.htm; Press Release, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Death Pen-
alty "Error" Study Has Error's of It's Own (June 19, 2000), available at http://www.
cjlf.org/releases/00-11.htm; Press Release, State of Nevada Office of the Attorney
General, Nevada's Death Penalty System is Working: Report Issued by University
Professor is Extremely Flawed (Sept. 19, 2000), available at http://ag.state.nv.us/
agpress/2000/00_0919a.pdf; Ronald Eisenberg, Prosecutor Comments on Latzer
and Cauthen, PROSECUTOR, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 16; Barry Latzer & James N.G.
Cauthen, Another Recount: Appeals in Capital Cases, PROSECUTOR, Jan.-Feb. 2001,
at 25; Edward J. Erler & Brian P. Janiskee, Not Light, But Heat: A Flawed Study
Skews The Debate Over Death Penalty, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Jan. 19, 2000, at
A24; Paul G. Cassell, We're Not Executing the Innocent, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2000,
at A14.
244. See Ron Eisenberg, "Innocence" and the Death Penalty, PA. DISTRICT
ATT'Ys ASS'N NEWSL., available at http://www.prodeathpenalty.comLiebman/
Pennsylvania.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2004).
245. See supra p. 143.
246. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
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the murderer shall die. 247 We have a history in this country of
abolitionist judges going outside their appropriate role. I would
like to know, for example, how many death penalties were re-
versed by judges who later affirmed other death penalties. So, a
study that analyzes error by equating error rates with reversal
rates is ultimately grounded on wishful thinking.
I want to emphasize constructive overlap in the Columbia
Study and what we're talking about tonight, because the study's
central reform was to limit it to the "worst of the worst." Profes-
sor Fagan did actually recite the principal recommendations. 248
I'd like to go through them very briefly in terms of the "worst of
the worst" and react to them, as well as the recommendations of
The Constitution Project,249 and the Illinois Commission. 250
There is an overlap, as we would hope.
First, requiring proof "beyond any doubt" is absurd. In this
world, we never have proof beyond a doubt. You don't have
proof beyond all doubt that the ceiling is not going to cave-in,
collapse and kill us all while we sit here.
You, in fact, risk your lives to attend this discussion. And
you, as I, will walk our children in a stroller on a city street,
where a truck may jump the curb and kill us. The fact is that
proof to an absolute certainty is an impossibility in life. It can-
not be a workable part of the death penalty. It is not going be
part of anything else you do in life. But the call for this stan-
dard does suggest importantly that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not sufficient in the death penalty context. Something
more is required, and that is proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and to a moral certainty. They are not identical, which takes
me back to a main theme in the opening comments: the emo-
tional component of the death penalty decision. Every moral
decision is partly emotional. Proof to a moral certainty does not
attach itself strictly to the rational faculty; it attaches itself to
the emotional faculty. One of the recommendations of the Illi-
nois Commission is that the jury be specifically instructed that
notwithstanding the fact that they have found at least one ag-
247. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, MAKKoTH 7a (I. Epstein ed., Soncino Press
1960).
248. See supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text.
249. The Constitution Project, supra note 39.
250. Illinois Report, supra note 38.
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gravating circumstance, and no mitigating circumstances, nev-
ertheless, they may still feel that death is not the appropriate
penalty.251
Theirs is exactly the right kind of recommendation because
it goes to what the issue is here, which is moral doubt, even
when there is no rational doubt. I applaud the spirit of the rec-
ommendation even though "proof beyond any doubt" is stated
absurdly. Proof to a moral certainty is fundamentally respon-
sive to the kind of jurisprudence necessary for a death penalty
that is just and humane.
Requiring that the aggravators substantially outweigh the
mitigators, I think is an excellent policy and the best way I
know how to go about it. However, I don't think it is necessarily
constitutionally mandated. I would certainly vote for it, advo-
cate for it, and lobby for it.
Professor Fagan gets caught in an old trap when he empha-
sizes the number of aggravators. When a jury fills out a form in
which it lists the aggravators, it lists mitigators, it adds them
up and says, "oh, four aggravators, one mitigator, OK, death."
That's the wrong kind of decision making, it seems to me. It's
not the number of aggravators because that allows a jury in fact
to avoid its responsibility by deluding itself into believing it is
engaging in a weighing process whose outcome is predeter-
mined by the legislative list. It's not the numbers; it's the qual-
ity. We need a richer language, a richer language that weighs
in terms that are not merely numerical.
Mental retardation is obviously a very complex subject. In
almost all cases, I think it constitutes a diminished capacity,
which should be a mitigator. But, almost all is not all.
The United States Supreme Court, as many of you know,
has decided the Atkins252 case and outlawed the death penalty
for the mentally retarded. But Atkins himself, had an IQ of
fifty-nine. 253 Nevertheless, he correctly used words like "d&t
vu" and "orchestra," knew the recipe for making chicken, could
count change, knew that J.F.K., Jr. was killed in a plane crash,
knew he was the son of the former President of the United
251. See id. at 151-52.
252. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
253. Id. at 309.
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States, and showed himself to be very much attuned and aware
of what was going on.254 I would not actually execute Atkins
because first of all the situation didn't clearly warrant it. Sec-
ondly, the proof is very troubling as to whether it was in fact he
or his co-felon who committed the killing and I would not be
convinced to a moral certainty that he deserved to die.
As to life without parole, before embracing it as an ade-
quate alternative, we have look at the quality of life without
parole. And I hope we get a moment or two in the discussion to
talk a little about death row, especially Florida's death row
which David Von Drehle255 knows better than I. But, I spent a
day there and witnessed the execution of Bennie Demps, which
Bill Erlbaum specifically pointed out as a prison killing that did
not deserve the death penalty.256 Demps was ostensibly exe-
cuted for the prison killing, which in and of itself ought not to
have qualified as capital punishment. But Bill Erlbaum omit-
ted to mention Bennie Demps' first death sentence, and the
murders for which he was really executed, morally executed, al-
though not strictly legally.257 The Puhlicks, husband and wife,
were a hard-working couple. She cleaned houses; he was a car-
penter. They spent their working lives putting their kids
through school. She was known as the "flower lady" because
she loved to grow things, and they dreamed of retiring down
South, perhaps to an orange grove. A cousin, a Florida real es-
tate agent called them up excitedly; a handyman fix-up in an
orange grove had just come on the market. So they went to see
their dream house and drove into the grove where Bennie
Demps was struggling to open a safe he had just robbed from a
house a few miles away. When the Puhlicks drove up, Demps
robbed them at gunpoint. Mrs. Puhlick nervously dropped her
lipstick, and when she instinctively bent down to pick it up,
Demps shot her in the stomach. Then he made her husband
climb into the trunk of their own car, then Demps made the
bleeding Mrs. Puhlick climb in next, and finally the real estate
agent. The robber shut the trunk of the car, and a few minutes
254. Joint Appendix at 477-85, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No.
98-8229 (6)), available at 2001 WL 34093997.
255. See VON DREHLE, supra note 42.
256. Demps v. State, 761 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2000).
257. See Demps v. State, 272 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1973).
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later, before he left, Demps machine-gunned the trunk. He ma-
chine-gunned the three of them. However, Mrs. Puhlick, the
"flower lady," took the bullets that were meant for her husband,
who lay for hours with his wife beside him dying in the trunk.
Mr. Puhlick lived to tell about it and identified Demps as did all
the forensic evidence. 258 Demps was sentenced to die for that
especially heinous double murder, but when the United States
Supreme Court decided Furman,25 9 all death row inmates
across the country, including Bennie Demps were released into
general population, where Demps killed again. That first double
murder was what Bennie Demps was really executed for.
That's what gave me a sense of satisfaction as I watched him
die. But, what made me feel dissatisfied was the painless way
in which he peacefully went to sleep while I was picturing again
his victims' suffering in the trunk of the car.
Returning, however, to some recommendations from The
Constitution Project, which also tried to confine itself to the"worst of the worst," or as it said to reserve it "for the most cul-
pable offenders." 260 They, too, would exclude the mentally re-
tarded and those under the age of eighteen. And perhaps their
single most important recommendation that we must adopt if
we really seek capital justice for only the "worst of the worst:"
eliminate the felony murder aggravator.261 But their recom-
mendations only went halfway. They said eliminate the felony
murder aggravator for those who did not kill or intend to kill,
citing two Supreme Court cases, Enmund262 and Tison.263 The
fact is that the felony murder aggravator does not belong in any
proper death penalty statute. Any time you need to get to the
death penalty because the person deserves it-such as rape,
which should independently qualify as torture-with a well-
drawn statute, you can get there. But, the majority of people on
death row are robber-murderers, who did not commit the kind
of killings that qualify them as the "worst of the worst." The
felony murder aggravator should be dropped entirely. We
258. Telephone Interview with Victim's Family (Apr. 11, 1999).
259. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
260. The Constitution Project, supra note 39, at xvi.
261. Id.
262. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
263. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
176 [Vol. 24:107
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY
should, however, continue to use the "pecuniary motive" ag-
gravator. But that, too, is also often wrongly applied and too
broadly applied to robbers. Most robbers who kill do not kill
from a pecuniary motive; they all rob from a pecuniary motive,
but they don't kill from a pecuniary motive. Attitude is what
counts and motive is what counts here.
So the robber who finds his victim going for the gun and
kills his victim in the struggle over the gun during the robbery
is a murderer, and deserves to spend the rest of his life in
prison. But, he does not deserve to die. That's the most impor-
tant place, then, where we need to narrow it. Keep the pecuni-
ary motive, which the Illinois Commission would have
dropped,264 but narrow it.
But we also need to expand it. We need to expand it and
understand that as a culture we are class-based to a great de-
gree. Corporate executives who knowingly maintain deadly
work places, and thereby callously kill their own poor employ-
ees, or knowingly pollute streams giving people cancer, deserve
in my view to die for it because they are acting with heinous,
atrocious and depraved indifference to human life. That's an-
other change, it seems to me, that we need to adopt, if we are
going after the "worst of the worst."
We must recognize as vitally important that the culpable
mental state of intent to kill has its moral equivalent in a de-
praved indifference to human life-a coldness, a wantonness, a
callousness. All of us are cruel to one extent or another. The
point is, again as with Jeffrey Kirchmeier, that it is only when
we are extremely cruel, the "worst of the worst," that we can
deserve to die. So it is, ultimately, a matter of degree. At some
point, as Anaximenes told us in the sixth century, B.C., "differ-
ences in degree become differences in kind."265
We discovered this, not specifically in the death penalty
context, but in exploring the nature of right and wrong and
what is real. So we have known for 2500 years how eventually
a difference of degree becomes a difference in kind. It is, as Ar-
istotle suggests, those who depart most radically from the
264. Illinois Report, supra note 38, at 65-80.
265. See 1 GuTHRm, supra note 53, at 139-40.
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mean, the most immoderately callous or cruel, who are the
worst.2 6 6
Those who are the coldest, who just simply don't give a
damn, like one guy I spent hours with inside Lorton prison. I
asked him why he shot sixteen people on a street corner with a
machine gun when he was only after one victim, who was sur-
rounded by strangers. I asked him whether he ever thought
about the people he shot and killed. And he said, "yeah, a little
bit." I asked, "Did you ever realize that they have people who
loved them, that they have sisters, mothers, children." He
shrugged his shoulders. "S.O.L."
What does that mean, "shit out of luck?" I looked at him
and he saw my brow narrow, and he said, "They shouldn't have
gotten in the way of my bullet."267 I heard that more than once
inside. It's that attitude-that coldness, callousness, wanton-
ness, depravity. Or, it's the sadism of the serial rapist killer.
Now, death is different. We plainly seek it too often. It is
definitely different as a matter of punishment. Is it different as
a matter of crime? Tough question. The easy answer, and the
answer so far from the United States Supreme Court, with one
possible exception-the rape of a child left open in Coker v.
Georgia26 8-the answer thus far from the Supreme Court is yes,
"death is different." 269 The death penalty must be reserved, if at
all, only for those who kill.
Yet, it seems to me that we have three contenders that
challenge us. My first choice for who should die in this context
is Robert Courtney, the pharmacist in the Midwest, worth $10
million, who diluted chemotherapy to 3% strength which he dis-
tributed to cancer victims desperate for a cure.270 This was a
case of a pharmacist worth millions of dollars diluting cancer
patients' chemo for money. Can you imagine anything more de-
praved? It cannot be proven yet that he killed anybody. Be-
cause of his callous indifference to human life, he deserves to
die. Another candidate is Richard Reid, "the shoe bomber,"
266. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 240.
267. Interview with Anonymous Inmate, Lorton Prison, Lorton Va. (Jan. 31,
1996).
268. 429 U.S. 815 (1976).
269. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
270. United States v. Courtney, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (W.D. Mo. 2002).
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who, but for the last second intercession by alert passengers
and crew, would have blown a commercial jet full of people out
of the sky.271 He deserves to die, although he did not kill any-
one. And a third, is a guy named Betheley, in Louisiana, who
raped three children, nine, seven and five-one of them was his
own-while he was HIV positive and knew it.272 Whether or not
the children live, he deserves to die. Again, it's ultimately a
function of attitude.
David Von Drehle says, if you must have it, confine the
death penalty to those about whom you can make factual asser-
tions: mass-murderers, serial-murderers, law-enforcement
victims. 27 3
I know this is unpopular to assert with death penalty sup-
porters, but the police-officer aggravator is not morally justi-
fied. If you kill a cop because he's a cop, then yes. But, if you
kill a cop in the heat of a gun battle that you did not initiate,
running away from a robbery that you did initiate, it's terrible
that you did it. You're a murderer; you deserve a life in prison.
But you are not the "worst of the worst." You do not deserve to
die.
"Under a life-sentence" is another aggravator, Von Drehle
suggests.274 The two of us may switch roles here. The "lifer"
aggravator is predicated on the completely mistaken fallacy
that "lifers" have nothing else to lose. Twelve years inside Lor-
ton Prison has shown me, beyond any doubt, that "lifers" often
have the most to lose. They are the most deterrable group pre-
cisely because they are going to be in prison for the rest of their
life. They care about the quality of their lives. Their privileges
are vital. The great threat to "lifers" is transfer.
Inside Lorton prison, while I was down there, I met a "lifer"
who had, after many years inside, obtained one of the best jobs
in the prison, delivering trays to those on lock-down. Unbe-
knownst to him one day, another prisoner who worked in the
kitchen laced a peanut butter sandwich with two lines of co-
caine to be passed along by the unwitting "lifer" to the prisoner
on lock-down. But somebody else who worked in the kitchen
271. See United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass 2002).
272. State v. Wilson, 96-1396 (La. 12/13/96).
273. See supra p. 169.
274. Id.
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snitched. The "lifer" was busted while delivering a cocaine-
laced peanut-butter sandwich. Now he himself was locked-
down for several months, lost all his privileges, lost his job, and
all that he had worked to acquire for years and years. Further-
more, he was due to be transferred to a tougher prison far from
his family.
Burning a guy like that, turning him into an unwilling con-
duit of contraband, is a killing offense inside. Soon afterwards,
not surprisingly, the guy who sent the sandwich was himself
murdered; the "lifer," locked down, had ordered it. Under David
Von Drehle's minimalist death penalty regime this murder
would qualify as the worst. Morally, however, it does not. The
killing is unquestionably mitigated, inside they would say justi-
fied, yet it was ordered by a lifer who, nevertheless, does not
deserve to die for it.
Mass murder challenges us to say how one human life is
infinitely valuable and yet taking two lives is worse than taking
one. Again, we need a language that is not our ordinary lan-
guage. Again, mathematics supplies it to us. During the 19th
century, Cantor gave us levels of infinity, a language by which
we can express that something is infinite, and another quantity
is also infinite. Yet, the greater is infinitely greater than the
lesser infinity.275 Mathematics supplies the metaphor of how an
individual victim's life can be of infinite value and yet killing
two is worse than killing one.
Life without parole; we need to know again how it feels, day
to day. What is the quality of life like? We all have been told
over and over again by some abolitionists that "life is worse
than death" and most especially that life on death row is a liv-
ing hell. I know that was my image of death row before I saw it,
bolstered by movie portrayals, and I suspect a living hell is
yours, too.
Recall, however, David Von Drehle's description of the con-
ditions on death row, this "living hell."
Some men are devoted to soap operas. Whole tiers get on the bars
every night and race one another for the right answers during
Jeopardy! Some watch the cop shows and cheer for the bad guys.
275. See generally JOSEPH WARREN DAUBEN, GEORG CANTOR: His MATHEMAT.
ICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE (Princeton Univ. Press 1990) (1979).
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At noon, and again at six in the evening, most prisoners watch the
news .... 276
When Ted Bundy, who killed maybe fifty young women, was on
Florida's death row
[iut was a custom in those days, according to several prisoners, for
inmates to put five bucks into a kitty before weekend visits. Af-
ter they put in their money, they drew lots. The money went to
the visiting room guards, who would look the other way, as the
winning inmate joined his girlfriend in the bathroom. Carole
Boone told friends that this was how she became pregnant by Ted
Bundy. She bore him a daughter.277
I spent a day on Florida's death row. What I saw absolutely
appalled me. Those who deserved the most punishment, pain,
suffering, got the least. The death row convicts, and they alone,
were allowed to smoke. They had televisions in their cells; they
were allowed to exercise in yards; they played volleyball; they
played basketball; they played softball with mitts provided,
while the rest of the inmates in Florida State Penitentiary exer-
cised in cages. Assure us that life without parole or life in
prison, as an alternative to the death penalty, is truly going to
be a life deserved, a life of suffering, before we can even hope to
discuss whether the "worst of the worst" have even begun to
approach their just deserts.
Finally, my quarrel with Von Drehle goes deeper, for in the
Lowest of the Dead, that powerful and unsettling protest, he de-
nies what we retributivist advocates essentially know to be
true. Von Drehle writes that:
the modem death penalty ... was built on sand; its theoretical
foundation was the notion that degrees of evil and depravity and
menace can be reliably distinguished and fixed into print by legis-
lative draftsmen and consistently applied by judges of a thousand
worldviews and temperaments.
In reality, the nature of the criminal soul is the terrain of a
Dostoevsky, a Dante, a Camus. It defies the grasp of legal defi-
nition as a blob of mercury defies tweezers. Modern death pen-
alty laws try to get their arms around a cloud-a dark cloud,
but nonetheless evanescent-and as a result, the laws are com-
276. VON DREHLE, supra note 42, at 126.
277. Id. at 377.
2003]
PACE LAW REVIEW
plicated and ornate but ultimately hollow; hollow in the sense
that their language is utterly open to new and shifting
interpretation.27 8
This is a compelling denunciation and denial of what we,
retributivist advocates, hold dear: That the "worst of the worst"
are real and can be known and that we can, and must, identify
and execute them as soon as possible.
Norman L. Greene
We will finish by 9:00 P.M. Guaranteed. David, I would like
you to respond to Robert Blecker's comment about the quality of
life on death row.
David Von Drehle
Professor Blecker is absolutely half-right about this. Death
row is, it seems pretty bad to me. It's solitary confinement,
maximum security, this is in Florida and I think Florida is
fairly typical, which means that in cells that average 6 x 9, or
about the size of your bathroom, probably, inmates spend an
average of twenty-three hours a day and most of them are there
for upwards of ten and on to twenty years. But, they do have
television sets. They do have in normal situations access to
reading material and, I describe all this in my book, there are
carts that come through twice a week where, if their families
have sent them money, they can buy candy or sandwiches or ice
cream or this sort of thing. And, in fact, as I agree with him, a
better life and I do say this in my book, than the non-lifers,
what they call the general population. But, there's a reason for
that, and the reason is that to get to the general population of
Florida State Prison, a person has to have washed out of at
least two other prisons. Nobody, except death row inmates,
start out there. It is for people who have gone to another prison,
and have gotten into fights, or have proved to be disciplinary
problems of one type or another and they get promoted to a
tougher prison and they screw-up again, and then they find
their way to Florida State Prison. They are considered incorrigi-
ble. Death row inmates, whether rightly or wrongly, are consid-
ered to be custodial in a way, awaiting their real punishment,
278. Id. at 237.
182 [Vol. 24:107
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY
which is supposed to be their execution. Now, that hasn't
turned out to be the case, I would agree there is probably some
re-thinking that could be done about what their actual punish-
ment is going to turn out to be and whether they're thinking
about it rightly. But, there is a reason other than sympathy for
them, that causes them to have better conditions than the gen-
eral population there. I mean, most death row guards and war-
dens, as you know, Robert, love to work with death row
populations because they actually have incentive to behave. It
reflects well on them in their appeal and in their clemency
hearings.
Norman L. Greene
Professor Fagan, do you want to say something?
Jeffrey Fagan
Well, I wanted to talk a little bit about Philadelphia and
prosecutors.
Norman L. Greene
If you can please do it quickly, because we are trying to
wrap up the program.
Jeffrey Fagan
Let me speak a little about Philadelphia. Philadelphia is a
city where the Prosecutors' office seeks the death penalty more
often than in Harris County (Houston), Texas, more often than
Oklahoma City, and more often than almost any other county in
the United States, according to our study.279 Now, Philadelphia
is a very interesting place where we can make a natural experi-
ment. Philadelphia tries their death penalty cases in two sys-
tems.280 In one system the cases are open to the Philadelphia
Defenders, the Capitol Defenders Unit (CDU), which is a good,
279. See generally Columbia Study II, supra note 41, at 247; see also David C.
Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); Jonathan DeMay, A District Attorney's Decision
Whether to Seek the Death Penalty: Toward an Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 767 (1999).
280. See, e.g., Emilie Lounsberry, Defense Issues in Capital Cases Hit Penn-
sylvania, Not New Jersey, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 6, 2003, at Al.
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experienced unit that specializes in death penalty cases.28' The
rest of the cases, about 80%, go to court appointed counsel. 28 2
The error rates for the court appointed counsel are roughly four
times the error rates we see in cases tried by the CDU.28 3 So, in
other words, here's a system where the deck is structurally
stacked. But this dilemma also presents an opportunity for a
natural experiment, which would let us understand the effects
of the quality of defense counsel on reversal rates, as well as the
strains on the quality of representation when the prosecution
overloads a system by indiscriminately seeking death
sentences.
Indeed, the lessons from Philadelphia demonstrate the
findings in the Columbia Study. There have been seventeen re-
versals since 1995.284 Nineteen of the last nineteen, have been
reversed. 28 5 It is hard to imagine these reversals are unwar-
ranted when they are decisions of judges who have been ap-
pointed primarily by conservative governors or conservative
presidents, and when these judges face the prospect of severe
electoral recriminations if portrayed as lenient on murders.
Consider, for example, the case of William Nieves 28 6. Here, the
State withheld evidence that the perpetrator was of a different
race than that of the defendant. 28 7 This "error" was committed
by Mr. Eisenberg's office. Fredric Jermyn's trial counsel had
less than two years experience, and failed to call a psychiatrist
despite evidence of physical torture.28 s Ronald Collins' trial
counsel failed to introduce evidence of a head injury, which was
subsequently documented by hospital records as brain dam-
age. 28 9 William Basemore's is a really interesting case because
281. Id. (The homicide unit in the Philadelphia Capital Defender Association
has never had a defendant sentenced to death since it started handling city mur-
der cases in 1993).
282. See Robert Dunham, Death Row Pennsylvania 2002, Refuse & Resist, at
http://www.refuseandresist.org/mumia/art.php?aid=580 (last visited Apr. 14,
2004).
283. Lounsberry, supra note 280.
284. Dunham, supra note 282.
285. Id.
286. See Commonwealth v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 2000).
287. See Editorial, Call Moratorium on Death Penalty, SUNDAY NEWS LANCAS-
TER PA., Mar. 9, 2003, at P2.
288. See Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).
289. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas overturned the death sentence
of Ronald Collins, ruling that trial counsel improperly failed to present a variety of
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his death sentence was reversed subject to a new sentencing
hearing because they found prejudice in the jury selection sys-
tem.290 In fact, the Philadelphia District Attorney has a jury
selection videotape which teaches its prosecuting deputies how
to exclude jurors on the basis of race. 291 Now, Philadelphia is a
tough City, but you can certainly understand the production of
a very high rate of error under those circumstances.
Norman L. Greene
Jeffrey, please ask your one question. I will give you some-
thing to think about in the meantime, Robert. What do you
mean by certain people might be thought deserving of a painful
and quick death and precisely what might that sort of death be?
Please think about that for a while.
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier
I'll try to be brief. The problem when we talk about moral
outrage as being the barometer in deciding who is executed is
that it ends up looking a lot like the obscenity test: "I know it
when I see it."292 And that is a problem because the Supreme
Court has stated that the Constitution will not tolerate arbi-
trariness in decisions of who lives and who dies where we can
just say "well, yeah, that's one that I would kill."293
Finally, if we look back over history, we see that the death
penalty has gradually been narrowed again and again. And if
we accept Professor Blecker's current proposal, that it should be
narrowed again, then that means that over the last twenty
years the executions of a substantial number of people have
mitigating evidence-family background, brain damage, and mental health evi-
dence-for Collins. See ABA DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION PRO-
JECT, BUILDING MOMENTUM: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CALL FOR A
MORATORIUM ON EXECUTIONS TAKES HOLD: A SUMMARY OF MORATORIUM RESOLU-
TION IMPACT FROM AUGUST 2001 THROUGH JUNE 2003 30 (2003), available at http:l!
www.abanet.org/moratorium/4thReport/4thAnnualReport.doc.
290. See Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717 (Pa. 2000).
291. AMERICAN RADIOWORKS, Juror Bias, at http://www.americanradioworks.
org/features/deadlydecisions/bias-print.html (Aug. 2002) (discussing a videotape of
former homicide prosecutor Jack McMahon, prepared by the Philadelphia District
Attorney's office in 1987 for instructing my prosecutors on the art ofjury selection).
292. See Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
293. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980).
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been morally wrong. So who is to say that twenty years from
now someone is not going to look at what we have done and
propose an even narrower death penalty. Then it will have
been morally wrong to have executed those we will execute
under this new narrower system. And so on. The only way for
us to eliminate the problems with the death penalty is to just
abolish capital punishment.
Norman L. Greene
I think that we are going to conclude the evening. I would
like to say a few things before we do so. Number one, Martin
Leahy, this is your night. We owe you a lot for this tonight.
Second, whatever you see here was all in the preparation.
Third, I thank you all for coming, and I hope we have a wonder-
ful publication.
